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NOTES
Discretionary Commodities Trading Account as a Security:
Is There a Common Enterprise?
Thomas C. Marshall brought suit against Lamson Brothers & Co. alleging
that he had opened a discretionary commodities trading account with the
Lamson Company over which the defendant company had full managerial
responsibility. Marshall further claimed that he acted in reliance on the rep-
resentations of Lamson's employee that substantial profits could be made and
that the account would be managed so as to limit losses to approximately
four hundred dollars. The account was opened in July 1970 and Marshall
was advised on July 29, 1970, that his commodities account was dissipated.
Marshall's complaint, which alleged violations of the Securities Act of 1933
and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, was challenged by a motion to
dismiss on the grounds that no security within the meaning of 'the Securities
Acts' was involved. Held, motion to dismiss denied: The discretionary
commodities trading account is an investment contract, and, thus, a security
within the meaning of the federal securities acts. Marshall v. Lamson Bros.
& Co., 368 F. Supp. 486 (S.D. Iowa 1974).
I. INVESTMENT CONTRACTS WITHIN THE SECURITIES ACTS
The Securities Act of 19332 was enacted for the purposes of providing in-
vestors with basic information about the character of securities and to pro-
hibit misrepresentation and fraud in the offering or secondary sale of those
securities. 3 Congress intended 'the Acts to cover a wide variety of invest-
ment opportunities and, accordingly, defined a security in "broad and general
terms so as to include within that definition the many types of instruments
that in our commercial world fall within -the ordinary concept of a security."'4
As defined in section 2(1) of the 1933 Act, a security is "any note, stock,
treasury stock, bond . . . certificate of interest or participation in any profit
sharing agreement . . . investment contract . . . or, in general, any interest
or instrument commonly known as a 'security'...
The Supreme Court first interpreted the "investment contract" language
of the 1933 Act in SEC v. C.M. Joiner Leasing Corp.,6 where an offering of
1. Securities Act of 1933, § 2(1), 15 U.S.C. § 77b(1) (1970); Securities ExchangeAct of 1934, § 3(a)(10), 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(10) (1970). It is necessary for any re-lief under the Securities Acts to prove that a "security" is involved. SEC v. C.M. Joiner
Leasing Corp., 320 U.S. 344, 355 (1943).
2. Securities Act of 1933, §§ 1-212, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-bbbb (1970).3. Securities Act of 1933, ch. 38, 48 Stat. 74 (enacting clause).
4. H.R. REP. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 11 (1933).5. Securities Act of 1933, § 2(1), 15 U.S.C. § 77(b)(1) (1970) (emphasis added).An almost identical definition of a security is provided in Securities Exchange Act of1934, § 3(a)(10), 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(10) (1970).
6. 320 U.S. 344 (1943).
leasehold rights was held to be a security within the meaning of the Act.7
The Court avoided articulating a general test for determining the existence
of an investment contract and held that the particular factual setting brought
the case within the ambit of the 1933 Act. In so doing the court looked to
the "character -the instrument is given in commerce by the terms of the offer,
the plan of distribution, and ,the economic inducements held out to the pros-
pect . . . [rather than] the nature of the assets back of a particular document
or offering."
Three years later, in the leading case of SEC v. W.J. Howey Co.9 the
Supreme Court again found the existence of an investment contract. Howey
involved the sale of -tracts in a citrus grove development coupled with an
optional agreement whereby the seller was to cultivate the tract, market the
produce, and remit the net proceeds to the investor. The Court stated that
neither the Securities Act of 1933 nor its legislative history defined "invest-
ment contract," and thus concluded that Congress used a term the only def-
inition of which was in judicial interpretations of state blue sky securities
laws.10 Relying on the applicable state interpretation of the term and the
fact situations to which the definition had been applied,"' the Court stated
that the test for an investment contract should be "whether the scheme in-
volves an investment of money in a common enterprise with profits to come
solely from the efforts of others.' 1 2  Although Howey went beyond Joiner
in enunciating a test for an investment contract, the Court clearly warned
against a rigid application of the formulation, stating that the test "em-
bodies a flexible rather than a static principle, one that is capable of adapta-
tion to meet the countless and variable schemes devised by those who seek
the use of -the money of others on the promise of profits."' 13
Although the Howey definition has been literally applied to determine
whether a security exists, 14 several courts have recognized the inadequacy of
7. Id.
8. Id. at 352-53. The Court, refusing to adopt a strict or liberal approach to statu-
tory interpretation, construed the words of the Act so as to carry out the generally ex-
pressed legislative policy, stating that "the reach of the Act does not stop with the ob-
vious and commonplace." Id. at 351.
9. 328 U.S. 293 (1946).
10. Id. at 298.
11. The court relied upon the definition established by the Supreme Court of Minne-
sota in State v. Gopher Tire & Rubber Co., 146 Minn. 52, 177 N.W. 937 (1920). An
investment contract was deemed to be a contract or scheme for "[t]he placing of capital
or laying out of money in a way intended to secure income or profit from its employ-
ment .... ." 177 N.W. at 938.
12. 328 U.S. at 301. The Court initially used the quoted language to describe the
facts presented by the state cases in which it had uniformly been held that an investment
contract existed. Subsequently, the same language was cast in terms of a comprehensive
test for an investment contract. The Court claimed, however, to be enunciating an old
test which was necessarily the basis of the earlier Joiner decision and lower federal court
cases. Id. at 299.
The Howey test, which involved an interpretation of the Securities Act of 1933, was
held applicable to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 in Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389
U.S. 332 (1967).
13. 328 U.S. at 299.
14. See, e.g., Mr. Steak, Inc. v. River City Steak, Inc., 324 F. Supp. 640 (D. Colo.
1970); Gallion v. Alabama Mkt. Centers, 282 Ala. 679, 213 So. 2d 841 (1968); Georgia
Mkt. Centers, Inc. v. Fortson, 225 Ga. 854, 171 S.E.2d 620 (1969); Koscot Interplane-
tary, Inc. v. King, 452 S.W.2d 531 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1970), error ref. n.r.e.
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a mechanical application of Howey. The existence of an investment con-
tract has been found by courts which have refused to apply literally the
Howey requirements that there be an expectation of profits 15 and that those
profits be derived solely from the efforts of those other than -the investor. 6
The SEC has taken -the position that the investment contract analysis de-
veloped in State Commissioner of Securities v. Hawaii Market Center, Inc.'t
is applicable under the federal securities laws.' 8 In Hawaii Market Center
the Supreme Court of Hawaii held a pyramid selling scheme to be an invest-
ment contract without resort to the Howey definition but rather by examin-
ing the economic realities of the promotion through a "risk capital" an-
alysis. 19 Thus, while Howey continues to provide the commonly accepted
test for the investment contract under the federal securities acts, 20 the con-
cept of the investment contract has been expanded considerably beyond a
narrow reading of that test.
II. DISCRETIONARY COMMODITIES ACCOUNTS AND THE
COMMON ENTERPRISE REQUIREMENT
The courts have frequently found an investment contract to exist in situ-
ations involving the sale or lease of property under an agreement whereby
the seller or lessor continues to manage and control the property. 2 ' The
courts have reasoned that the true nature of these arrangements is the exist-
ence of an enterprise operating on capital furnished by a group of investors
15. Silver Hills Country Club v. Sobieski, 55 Cal. 2d 811, 361 P.2d 906, 13 Cal.
Rptr. 194 (1961) (sales of country club memberships to generate capital with which to
develop the country club were held to be securities through the court's emphasis on the
risk of loss to the investor rather than on the investor's expectation of profits).
16. SEC v. Glenn W. Turner Enterprises, Inc., 474 F.2d 476 (9th Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 414 U.S. 821 (1973) (pyramid selling scheme held to be an investment contract
despite selling efforts of the investors through the court's emphasis on the fact that the
essential managerial decisions were made by persons other than the investors); accord,
SEC v. Koscot Interplanetary, Inc., 497 F.2d 473 (5th Cir. 1974); Mitzner v. Cardet
Int'l, Inc., 358 F. Supp. 1262 (N.D. I11. 1973).
17. 52 Hawaii 642, 485 P.2d 105 (1971).
18. SEC Securities Act Release No. 5211, Exchange Act Release No. 9387 (Nov.
30, 1971).
19. 485 P.2d at 109. The "risk capital" analysis adopted by the Supreme Court of
Hawaii was suggested by Professor Coffey in his article analyzing the essential economic
characteristics of security transactions. Coffey, The Economic Realities of a "Security":
Is There a More Meaningful Formula?, 18 W. RES. L. REV. 367 (1967). The test
adopted, in essence, provides that an investment contract exists when an investor fur-
nishes initial value to a promoter, subjecting that value to the risks of an enterprise with
the reasonable expectation of benefit induced by the promoter's representations, and re-
taining no actual or practical control over the managerial decisions of the enterprise.
485 P.2d at 109.
20. See, e.g., Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332 (1967); SEC v. United Benefit
Life Ins. Co., 387 U.S. 202 (1967); SEC v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., 359 U.S.
65 (1959); SEC v. MacElvain, 417 F.2d 1134 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S.
972 (1970); Chapman v. Rudd Paint & Varnish Co., 409 F.2d 635 (9th Cir. 1969).
21. See, e.g., Kemmerer v. Weaver, 445 F.2d 76 (7th Cir. 1971) (sale of beavers);
Continental Marketing Corp. v. SEC, 387 F.2d 466 (10th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 391
U.S. 905 (1968); Blackwell v. Bentsen, 203 F.2d 690 (5th Cir. 1953), cert. dismissed,
347 U.S. 925 (1954) (sale of tract of land devoted to citrus production); SEC v. Orange
Grove Tracts, 210 F. Supp. 81 (D. Mass. 1962) (sale of units of citrus grove); SEC
v. Payne, 35 F. Supp. 873 (S.D.N.Y. 1940) (sale of foxes); SEC v. Pyne, 33 F. Supp.
988 (D. Mass. 1940) (sale of shares in fishing boats); Prohaska v. Hemmer-Miller Dev.
Co., 256 Ill. App. 331 (1930) (sale of farm land to be paid for with crops raised by
vendor).
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who are attracted by the prospect of participating in a highly profitable ven-
ture. The facts of these cases are similar to the Howey situation in that all
involve a common enterprise operated by persons other than the investor.22
However, the courts have not limited the situations giving rise to investment
contracts to those which parallel the facts of Howey.23
The courts which have considered whether a discretionary commodities
trading account is a security24 are in conflict as to whether a common enter-
prise is a necessary element of the investment contract. In Maheu v. Rey-
nolds & Co., 25 where a discretionary commodities account was held to be a
security, the court purportedly relied upon the Howey definition but found
,that an investment contract may exist even in the absence of a common en-
terprise or a pooling of funds among investors. 26  However, several cases
decided since Maheu have stated that no security is involved in the discre-
tionary commodities account situation since no common enterprise exists.27
In Milnarik v. M-S Commodities, Inc.28 an investor had deposited funds
with a commodities broker, giving the broker full discretion to invest in com-
modities futures.29 In applying the Howey -test to the facts of the case, the
court found that in the absence of a pooling arrangement among investors
there was no common enterprise. 30 Thus, in contrast to Maheu, the recent
22. See cases cited note 21 supra.
23. See, e.g., SEC v. Glenn W. Turner Enterprises, Inc., 474 F.2d 476 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 414 U.S. 821 (1973) (pyramid selling scheme). See also Note, Resurrect-
ing the Spirit of the Securities Act of 1933, 27 Sw. L.J. 554 (1973).
24. It is generally held that commodities futures contracts, as distinguished from a
commodities trading account, are not securities. See, e.g., McCurnin v. Kohlmeyer &
Co., 347 F. Supp. 573 (D. La. 1972), aff'd, 477 F.2d 113 (5th Cir. 1973); Schwartz
v. Bache & Co., 340 F. Supp. 995 (S.D. Iowa 1972); Berman v. Orimex Trading, Inc.,
291 F. Supp. 701 (S.D.N.Y. 1968); Sinva, Inc. v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner &
Smith, Inc., 253 F. Supp. 359 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
25. 282 F. Supp. 423 (S.D.N.Y. 1967); accord, Berman v. Orimex Trading, Inc.,
291 F. Supp. 701 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
26. Although Maheu involved a joint account, the opinion clearly rests on the posi-
tion that a pooling of funds is not necessary for the investment contract and makes no
attempt to classify the joint account as a pooling arrangement. The court relied upon
the statement of Professor Loss in his discussion of investment contracts, "the line [be-
tween what is a security and what is not] is drawn * * * where neither the element
of a common enterprise nor the element of reliance on the efforts of another is present."
Maheu v. Reynolds & Co., 282 F. Supp. 423, 429 (S.D.N.Y. 1967), quoting 1 L. Loss,
SECURITIES REGULATION 491 (2d ed. 1961).
27. Milnarik v. M-S Commodities, Inc., 457 F.2d 274 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 409
U.S. 887 (1972); Stuckey v. duPont Glore Forgan, Inc., 59 F.R.D. 129 (N.D. Cal.
1973); Wasnowic v. Chicago Bd. of Trade, 352 F. Supp. 1066 (M.D. Pa. 1972), af'd,
491 F.2d 752 (3d Cir. 1973).
28. 457 F.2d 274 (7th Cir. 1972).
29. In the discretionary commodities trading accounts under discussion the broker
does not share in any profits generated but receives only a commission on the commodity
transactions. Trading accounts involving a contract whereby the investor and the broker
are to split profits are considered classic examples of a security as a "certificate of inter-
est or participation in a profit-sharing agreement." 1 L. Loss, supra note 26, at 489.
See, e.g., SEC v. Wickham, 12 F. Supp. 245 (D. Minn. 1935); People v. White, 124
Cal. App. 548, 12 P.2d 1078 (1932); State v. Hofacre, 206 Minn. 167, 288 N.W. 13
(1939). See also SEC v. Addison, 194 F. Supp. 709 (N.D. Tex. 1961); First Nat'l Say.
Foundation, Inc. v. Samp, 274 Wis. 118, 80 N.W.2d 249 (1956).
30. The court of appeals adopted the language of the district court, stating, "[i]n
essence, this contract creates an agency-for-hire rather than constituting the sale of a
unit of a larger enterprise. . . . Each contract creating this relationship is unitary in
nature and each will be a success or failure without regard to the others." Milnarik
v. M-S Commodities, Inc., 457 F.2d 274, 277 (7th Cir. 1972).
A distinguishable situation exists where the funds of the plaintiffs are pooled in an
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cases have found that no security was involved in discretionary commodities
accounts ,because the Howey test for an investment contract was not met.
III. MARSHALL V. LAMSON BROS. & CO.
The district court for the Southern District of Iowa focused on two ques-
tions in determining that a discretionary commodities 'trading account is a
security as defined in the 1933 and 1934 Securities Acts. The initial ques-
tion for the court was whether a common enterprise is a necessary element
of an investment con-tract. Having found that the common enterprise is re-
quired, the second question was whether such a requirement is satisfied by
a discretionary commodities trading account.
Confronted with conflicting lines of authority, 3  the court in Marshall
found the common enterprise essential for the existence of an investment
contract "[i]n view of the emphasis placed on 'common enterprise' in Howey
and its repeated use as a criterion of investment contract in subsequent
cases .... ,,32 Considering the second question, the court noted that the
term "common enterprise" is not defined in Howey.33 In interpreting this
element of the Howey test, the court followed the approach taken by the
Ninth Circuit in SEC v. Glenn W. Turner Enterprises, Inc.,34 which dealt
with the Howey requirement that profits come "solely" from the efforts of
others.s 5 As 'in Turner, the court in Marshall chose to give the Howey test
a broad reading rather than interpreting it as "a strict or literal limitation on
the definition of an investment contract."'3 6  Thus, in Marshall, the Howey
test was adopted but was interpreted in light of the more general aspects of
Howey and Joiner which provide a flexible approach for determining the
scope of the investment contract. Upon examining the cases on which Howey
relied, the court discovered that several of -those cases involved no pooling
of funds,3 7 indicating that a pooling arrangement was not necessary for the
account for commodities trading. Such an arrangement has been held to be an invest-
ment contract in Anderson v. Francis I. duPont & Co., 291 F. Supp. 705 (D. Minn.
1968).
31. See notes 25-30 supra and accompanying text.
32. 368 F. Supp. at 488. The court relied on Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332,
338 (1967); SEC v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co. of America, 359 U.S. 65, 72 n.13
(1959); SEC v. Glenn W. Turner Enterprises, Inc., 474 F.2d 476, 481 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 414 U.S. 821 (1973); Continental Marketing Corp. v. SEC, 387 F.2d 466, 470
(10th Cir. 1967).
33. 368 F. Supp. at 488.
34. 474 F.2d 476 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 821 (1973).
35. Turner held that the test for determining whether the efforts of others are suffi-
cient to constitute an investment contract under Howey should be "whether the efforts
made by those other than the investor are the undeniably significant ones, those essential
managerial efforts which affect the failure or success of the enterprise." Id. at 482. The
court stated that its holding represented no real departure from the Howey definition.
Id. at 483. It explained that the Howey requirement that profits come "solely" from
the efforts of others was a qualification which exactly fitted the circumstances in Howey.
Id. at 481. In Marshall, however, the court apparently assumed that Howey's common
enterprise requirement was intended to be broader than a mere description of the facts
of that case.
36. 368 F. Supp. 486, 488 (S.D. Iowa 1974).
37. See Prohaska v. Hemmer-Miller Dev. Co., 256 Ill. App. 331 (1930) (sale of
distinct parcels of land with purchase price to come from crops grown by seller on that
parcel held to be an investment contract despite absence of co-mingling of crops); State
v. Evans, 154 Minn. 95, 191 N.W. 425 (1922) (contractual relationship between pro-
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satisfaction of the common enterprise requirement.38 Having determined
that Howey did not limit the investment contract to situations involving a
pooling of funds, the court found no reason to impose such a requirement
on discretionary commodities accounts. The court found that the protection
afforded the investor under the Securities Acts provides no basis for a dis-
tinction between the single investor who commits his funds to a promoter and
"those hapless capitalists who are not alone in their misfortune. '39
To complete its interpretation of Howey's common enterprise require-
ment, the court speculated that the use of the phrase "common enterprise"
may have been "nothing more than an attempt to require some sort of 'busi-
ness' interest in an investment contract . . . to distinguish investment con-
tracts from such passive investment opportunities as time saving accounts in
banks."' 40  This interpretation led the court to conclude that the common en-
terprise requirement is satisfied when a broker engages in commodities trad-
ing on behalf of the investor furnishing the funds for such activity. The
court considered its interpretation of the Howey definition consonant with
the principle that "the '33 and '34 Acts are remedial legislative acts which
should be construed broadly to effectuate their purpose and with what can
only be described as the continually expanding reach of federal regulation
of securities transactions .... -41
The words "common enterprise" have a variety of possible meanings but
the interpretation of the phrase as merely a requirement of a "business in-
terest" finds little support in Howey. Although the court seemed to stretch
this "common enterprise" language beyond any reasonable interpretation of
the words rather than merely adopting a new test which would be applicable
to situations involving no common enterprise, the court reached a judicious
result. The court in Marshall soundly concluded that the policy of the Se-
curities Acts would be poorly served by protecting only those investors who
have pooled their funds in a trading account while denying coverage to the
single investor maintaining an otherwise identical account. 42
moter and purchaser of land with no pooling of property or funds constituted investment
contracts).
38. The court found support in Professor Loss' discussion of investment contracts
where he stated, "[i]n all these cases proof of some sort of pooling arrangement among
investors ...helps, but it is not essential." 368 F. Supp. at 489, quoting 1 L. Loss,
supra note 26, at 489. The rationale of Milnarik is that in the discretionary commodi-
ties account situation the common enterprise element can only be satisfied where a pool-
ing arrangement exists. See note 30 supra and accompanying text. Similarly, the court
in Maheu, which held the common enterprise unnecessary, may also have considered the
term "common enterprise" to mean a pooling of funds. Assuming that an investment
contract may exist without a pooling arrangement, see note 37 supra and accompanying
text, the conclusion would follow that a common enterprise is not required. However,
in Marshall the court recognized a distinction between the terms, and found that Howey
requires the existence of a common enterprise but not necessarily a pooling of funds.
39. 368 F. Supp. at 489.
40. Id. See also Long, An Attempt to Return "Investment Contracts" to the Main-
stream of Securities Regulation, 24 OKLA. L. REV. 135, 162 (1971), which proposes a
new test for the investment contract, requiring that the investment be in a "venture" as
opposed to a "common enterprise." The description of a "venture," as a "concerted ef-
fort to bring about some particular result or group of results," seems consistent with the
Marshall interpretation of a common enterprise. 368 F. Supp. at 489.
41. 368 F. Supp. at 489.




The significance of the Marshall case is found in two aspects of the de-
cision. First, by adhering to the Howey test, the court set a precedent for
finding a discretionary commodities account to be a security without depart-
ing from the most commonly accepted test for an investment contract. Such
a decision conflicts with several recent cases, such as Milnarik, which found
that the trading accounts involved failed to meet the Howey test. 48 The con-
trast between the Marshall and the Milnarik interpretations illustrates the
second significant aspect of the decision, that is, the broad interpretation of
Howey in an attempt to effectuate the purpose of the Securities Acts. When
given a literal interpretation, the Howey test proves inadequate as a means
of achieving the protection intended by the federal securities legislation.
While many transactions easily fall within the ambit of the Howey definition,
the language of the case may also be read to exclude other situations which
should properly be considered investment contracts. The Marshall decision,
in conjunction with SEC v. Glenn W. Turner Enterprises, Inc.,44 expands the
application of the term "investment contract" well beyond the situations lit-
erally described by Howey. The effect of these decisions is to shift the an-.
alysis from an application of the Howey language to an examination of the
facts of each case to determine whether -the investment scheme is within the
parameters of the Securities Acts. Recognition that the Howey test should
be treated as merely a description of one of the various types of investment
contracts would obviate the need for extremely broad interpretations of the
definition. However, as long as Howey is accepted as providing the com-
prehensive test for an investment contract, cases such as Marshall will con-
tinue to interpret -that test broadly and thereby implement the policy of fed-
eral regulation of securities.
David J. Graham
Employee Covenants Not To Compete:
The Justin Bootstrap Doctrine
Soon after Joe Yost and Roger Souder left managerial positions with Justin
Belt Company, they were hired by Tony Lama Company. About a month
later, Justin filed suit against Yost and Souder for damages and injunctive
relief, alleging conspiracy and a breach of confidential relations arising out
of 'their previous employment with Justin. A settlement was reached. In-
cluded in the settlement agreement was a covenant which restricted Yost
and Souder from engaging in any phase of the business of manufacturing
43. See notes 27-30 supra and accompanying text.
44. 474 F.2d 476 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 821 (1973).
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boots.' Other provisions of the settlement agreement allowed them to en-
ter the belt business with Tony Lama. Two years later Yost and Souder
filed suit for declaratory judgment, praying that ,the settlement agreement
be declared unenforceable and, in the alternative, that the agreement be re-
formed to prohibit their entrance into ,the boot business for only two years.
Justin cross-claimed, alleging breach of the settlement agreement, and sought
injunctive relief. The trial court reformed the agreement to provide that
Souder would not enter the boot business any place west of the Mississippi
River for a period of seven years, and issued an appropriate injunction.2
The court of civil appeals reversed,' holding the settlement agreement void
as a contract in unreasonable restraint of trade.4  The Supreme Court of
Texas granted writ of error. Held, reversed: A covenant not to compete
may properly be made part of an agreement in settlement of a pending law-
suit. A covenant not to compete which is unlimited in time and area is not
void but may be reformed so as to include reasonable restraints as to time
and area, and may, as reformed, be enforced by -the courts. Justin Belt Co.
v. Yost, 502 S.W.2d 681 (Tex. 1973).
I. THE RULE OF REASON AS APPLIED TO EMPLOYEE COVENANTS
Traditionally, employee covenants, by which an employee agrees not to
compete with -the employer after termination of employment, 5 have been in-
cluded in employment contracts, or made during an existing employment.6
1. The agreement also provided that Yost and Souder would not copy Justin belts,
communicate any confidential information, criticize Justin or its products, use any of
Justin's "special" equipment or techniques, or engage in any unfair trade practice. Yost
and Souder, along with Tony Lama Company, further agreed that they would not em-
ploy any person who would be employed by Justin after Feb. 16, 1970. Justin Belt Co.
v. Yost, 502 S.W.2d 681, 682-83 n.1 (Tex. 1973).
2. Yost was general manager of the belt-making branch of Justin. Souder was gen-
eral manager of the boot-making branch. The covenant restricting entrance into the
boot business was enforced against Souder only, while the remainder of the agreement
was enforced against Yost, Souder, and Tony Lama. The opinion of the Supreme Court
of Texas states that both Yost and Souder were enjoined from making boots, however
under no authority could the trial court have done so. Yost had never worked in the
boot business and restricting him from making boots would not serve to protect any "le-
gitimate interest" of Justin. See note 20 infra and accompanying text. See also Arthur
Murray Dance Studios, Inc. v. Witter, 62 Ohio L. Abs. 17, 28, 105 N.E.2d 685, 691
(C.P. 1952).
3. Yost v. Justin Belt Co., 488 S.W.2d 850 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1972),
rev'd, 502 S.W.2d 681 (Tex. 1973). The covenant was held void as an employee cove-
nant not ancillary to an existing employment or contract of employment. See RESTATE-
MENT OF CONTRAcTs § 515(e) (1932) [hereinafter cited as RESTATEMENT] (cited as
controlling by the court).
4. Although the court held the agreement void, it did reform the trial court's in-junction, basing its decision upon the implied obligations of employees not to divulge
confidential information and not to interfere with contractual relations between Justin
and other employees. For a full discussion of such employee torts see W. PROSSER,
TORTS § 129, at 945, § 130 (4th ed. 1971). See also RESTATEMENT OF TORTS §§ 708,
711-12 (1938); Hannigan, The Implied Obligation of an Employee, 77 U. PA. L. REV.
970 (1929).
5. Such agreements will hereinafter be termed "employee covenants." A parallel
situation involves restrictive covenants ancillary to the sale of business good will. See
Blake, Employee Agreements Not To Compete, 73 HARV. L. REV. 625, 646-48 (1960)
[hereinafter cited as Blake] for a comparison of the two types of noncompetition agree-
ments.
6. Although Tustin involves the more unique situation in which the employee cove-
nant was consummated after the employment was terminated, it will be necessary to dis-
cuss the traditional type of covenant as well.
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That such covenants are a restraint of trade is self-evident, in that they tend
to reduce the mobility of workers, thus lessening personal freedom and di-
minishing competition and industry-wide dissemination of information. 7
However, by assuring himself that his employee will not vanish and take
with him information that would tend to injure him, an employer is more
likely to give his employee a higher degree of responsibility, resulting in both
the stimulation of the employee and the betterment of the enterprise. In
view of the advantages and disadvantages of these covenants, the courts have
resorted to a balancing approach in assessing their enforceability, pitting the
interests served against the interests thwarted. This balancing approach has
been developed by a long line of cases" and has been referred to as the "rule
of reason."9
At common law employee covenants were void as against public policy, 10
not because of the inequities that might flow from such agreements, but be-
cause they 'breached the rigid rules of the guild system." However, ,the
transition to the market economy carried with it a recognition that such agree-
ments could be favorable to the public interest,' 2 as productivity was found
to be best served by allowing the entrepreneur considerable freedom in his
market strategy,'1 even 'though in so doing he might diminish his employees'
freedom. In such an environment employee covenants presented a real
problem, the courts being forced -to weigh market freedom against freedom
of contract. The question became, when may a man contract away his
economic freedom.' 4
Throughout the 18th and 19th centuries employee covenants limited in
7. See 6A A. CoRBIN, CoNTRAcTs § 1380 (1962) [hereinafter cited as CORBIN].
See also Blake 627.
8. See the cases discussed in the remainder of this section. The development of
the "rule of reason" in England is discussed at length in Davies v. Davies, 36 Ch. D.
359 (1887). Development of the rule in America is discussed in Arthur Murray Dance
Studios, Inc. v. Witter, 62 Ohio L. Abs. 17, 105 N.E.2d 685 (C.P. 1952), and Eaton,
Contracts in Restraint of Trade, 4 HARv. L. REV. 128 (1890).
9. Blake 649.
10. The first reported decision concerning an employee covenant is The Dier's Case,
Y.B. Pasch. 2 Hen. 5, f. 5, pl. 26 (1414).
11. The earliest cases of employee covenants arose from agreements in which one
would agree that, after his term of apprenticeship had run, he would not practice his
trade in the same city or area as his master. Such an agreement flew in the face of
the guild system because after the term of apprenticeship one was no longer bound to
his master. Such an agreement did bind the apprentice to his master after his term had
run and was viewed as an unscrupulous method by which the master could extend the
term of apprenticeship. For a more complete discussion of the guild system, see 8 W.
HOLDSWORTH, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 56-62 (2d ed. 1937).
12. "So for a valuable consideration, and voluntarily, one may agree that he will
not use his trade; for volenti non fit injuria." Broad v. Jollyfe, Cro. Jac. 596, 79 Eng.
Rep. 509 (K.B. 1621).
13. See generally A. SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 118-27 (Mod. Lib. ed. 1937).
14. In the most oft-cited case concerning covenants not to compete, Mitchell v. Rey-
nolds, 1 P. Wms. 181, 190, 24 Eng. Rep. 347, 350 (Q.B. 1711), the court noted that
employee covenants should be viewed with care because of the "great abuses" that they
are subject to by unethical employers. Stating that there was a presumption that all re-
straints of trade were invalid, the court nevertheless held that it was the best interest
of the public policy that "[A] man may, upon a valuable consideration by his own con-
sent, and for his own profit give over his trade . . ." and that a limited restraint of trade
[limited in time and/or area] would be enforced by the courts when "just and honest."
Id. at 186, 197, 24 Eng. Rep. at 349, 352. See note 18 infra for a further discussion
of Mitchell.
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time and area were generally upheld on a strong freedom of contract basis, 15
while general restraints of trade were void. 16 The sole considerations were
the duration and the expanse of the particular restraint. In a famous En-
glish case, Herbert Morris v. Saxelby,17 the court noted that the "general-
limited" test' s was merely one rule of reasonableness to be applied to the
particular facts of each case, thereby doing away with previous arbitrary dis-
tinctions based solely upon whether a particular covenant was "general" or
"limited." The court went further to require first, that the employer must
show that the restraint provided by the covenant is reasonable, taking into
account the interests of both employer and employee, and, second, that the
covenant must protect some legitimate interest of the employer and must not
serve solely to limit the employer's future competition. The holding in
Herbert Morris was soon followed by 'the American courts, 19 and the rule of
reason has since been uniformly applied. 20
A. Severability and Reformation
An employer can now be assured that any "reasonable" restraint which
he includes in his employment contract will be upheld in the courts. 21 But,
15. The history of the English treatment of employee covenants is extensively dis-
cussed in Davies v. Davies, 36 Ch. D. 359 (1887).
16. It is a general rule of law . . . that all contracts in general restraint of
trade are illegal and void . . . general restraints upon trade have a tend-
ency to promote monopolies and to discourage industry, enterprise, andjust competition, and thus do mischief to the party by the loss of his live-
lihood and the subsistence of his family, and mischief to the public, by de-
priving it of the devices and labors of a useful member.
Kerr, Contracts in Restraint of Trade, 22 AM. L, REV. 873, 875 (1888).
17. [1916] 1 A.C. 688.
18. See Blake 638-39. The limited-general distinction was first developed in
Mitchell v. Reynolds, 1 P. Wms. 181, 24 Eng. Rep. 347 (1711), which did not involve
an employee covenant, but a covenant incidental to the sale of a bakery (good will).
The Mitchell case distinguished good will covenants from employee covenants, but the
distinction was seldom given more than lip-service by the courts. Dicta in Mitchell
stated that employee covenants required special consideration as well as limitations upon
the restraint. See notes 35-40 infra and accompanying text.
19. Compare the distinction in note 18 supra with the development of Professor
Williston's treatment of employee covenants. In the 1920 edition of his treatise on con-
tracts, Professor Williston stated that "the distinction [between employee covenants and
covenants ancillary to sale of good will] seems unadvisable as a positive rule of law."
3 S. WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 1643 (1920) [hereinafter cited as WILLISTON]. How-
ever, in a later edition he made note of the then current trend in America: "Inhere
is a tendency in the United States to follow the English courts in differentiating between
contracts in restraint of trade and contracts in restraint of employment." 5 id. § 1643(rev. ed. 1937). In 1932 the Restatement also recognized different tests of "reasonable-
ness" to be applied to the two types of covenants. RESTATEMENT § 515, comment
b.
20. See, e.g., cases cited infra note 21 and RESTATEMENT §§ 514-16. For a full dis-
cussion of factors used to determine whether a restraint is reasonable, see Comment,
Contracts in Restraint of Trade: Employee Covenants Not To Compete, 21 ARK. L. REV.
214 (1967). See also Arthur Murray Dance Studios, Inc. v. Witter, 62 Ohio L. Abs.
17, 105 N.E.2d 685 (C.P. 1952) (setting forth 41 "tests" for reasonableness).
21. See, e.g., Budget Rent-A-Car Corp. of America v. Fein, 342 F.2d 509, 514 (5th
Cir. 1965); United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271, 282 (6th Cir. 1898);
Keller v. California Liquid Gas Corp., 363 F. Supp. 123, 127 (D. Wyo. 1973); Short
v. Fahrney, 502 P.2d 982, 984 (Colo. App. 1972); House of Vision, Inc. v. Hiyane, 37
Ill. 2d 22, 225 N.E.2d 21, 24 (1967); Wissman v. Boucher, 150 Tex. 326, 331, 240
S.W.2d 278, 280 (1951); Orkin Exterminating Co. v. Wilson, 501 S.W.2d 408, 410-11
(Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1973), error dismissed.
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since employee covenants are almost always negotiated before termination of
employment, 'neither the employee nor the employer can accurately forecast
what a "reasonable" restraint will be when the time comes to seek enforce-
ment. In an early case22 a restrictive covenant provided the covenantor
would not compete in any area near the employer's store or any other shop
that the employer "shall think proper to remove to."'23  The court, holding
the restraint too general, severed the latter clause and enjoined the employee
from competing only in the area of the employer's existing shop. The court,
using what 'has been referred to as the "blue pencil" test,24 assumed that the
parties intended a reasonable restraint and enforced the covenant, but only
after eliminating the unreasonable portion of the writing.25
Most jurisdictions, including Texas, have adopted the doctrine of reforma-
tion (as opposed to the "blue pencil" test)26 when dealing with employee
covenants. Using this doctrine, the courts have issued injunctions which
were narrower than the terms of the covenant even though the language of
the covenant itself provided no basis for severance. 27  Though there are per-
suasive arguments to the contrary, 28 this appears to 'be the most equitable
rule. Where it appears that the parties intended to formulate a reasonable
22. Chessman v. Nainby, 2 Str. 740, 93 Eng. Rep. 819 (K.B. 1726).
23. Id.
24, If the covenant can be severed as written, the court will strike out the unreason-
able portion with a judicial "blue pencil," thereby leaving only the reasonable terms of
the agreement.
25. This case was decided only a few years after Mitchell v. Reynolds, 1 P. Wms.
181, 24 Eng. Rep. 347 (Q.B. 1711), which held that "general" restraints of trade were
void. It is submitted that the decision would be similar using today's rule of reason.
See, e.g., Hill v. Central West Public Serv. Co., 37 F.2d 451 (5th Cir. 1930) (restraint
throughout Texas enforced as to city of Dallas); Weatherford Oil Tool Co. v. Campbell,
161 Tex. 310, 340 S.W.2d 950 (1960) (The covenant restrained employee from compe-
tition "where [the employer] may be operating or carrying on any business .... ." id.
at 312, 340 S.W.2d at 951. The court held it was proper to cut down the restraint to
a reasonable area.). Contra, Thomas v. Coastal Indus. Servs., Inc., 214 Ga. 832, 108
S.E.2d 328 (1959) (restraint naming 46 counties, where employee had contacts in only
31 counties, held void as a whole).
26. The Restatement adheres to the "blue pencil" test. RESTATEMENT § 518. Cor-
bin notes that § 518 is a result of the belief that the blue pencil test supported the greater
weight of authority in 1932, but that this is no longer the case. 6A CORBIN § 1390,
at 69. Williston, who drafted § 518, agrees that it no longer represents the majority
rule. 14 WILLISTON § 1647C, at 293-94 (3d ed. 1972).
27. E.g., Denny v. Roth, 296 S.W.2d 944 (Tex. Civ. App.-Galveston 1956), error
ref. Some jurisdictions still utilize the "blue pencil" test. E.g., Interstate Fin. Corp.
v. Wood, 69 F. Supp. 278 (E.D. I1l. 1946) (applying Illinois law); John Roane, Inc. v.
Tweed, 33 Del. Ch. 4, 89 A.2d 548 (Sup. Ct. 1952); Wisconsin Ice & Coal Co. v. Lueth,
213 Wis. 42, 250 N.W. 819, 821 (1933), wherein the court stated: "[I]f the contract
itself furnishes no basis for dividing the territory to which the restriction applies, the
restrictive covenant is void .... ." Still other jurisdictions refuse any severence or ref-
ormation of any covenant held unreasonable. Welcome Wagon, Inc. v. Morris, 224
F.2d 693 (4th Cir. 1955); Sonotone Corp. v. Baldwin, 227 N.C. 387, 42 S.E.2d 352
(1947).
28. One objection is that, if reformation is universally allowed, the employer will
attempt to write overly broad restrictions in his employment contracts, knowing that he
will nevertheless be awarded a reasonable restriction should he decide to take it into
court. For every covenant that finds its way into court, there are hundreds that do not,
and there are hundreds of employees bound by unreasonable contracts, not knowing
whether to change occupations or breach the contract and face the expense of a lawsuit.
Respondent's Motion for Rehearing at 5-7, Justin Belt Co. v. Yost, 502 S.W.2d 681 (Tex.
1973). See also Blake 682.
[Vol. 28
NOTES
restriction, 29 the court will act in the balanced interests of both parties by
issuing an injunction to protect what turns out to be reasonable at the time
enforcement is sought. By .taking notice of uncertainty at the time of the
contract, the court can more readily enforce the intended relationship of that
agreement. The best-reasoned Texas decision on the point of reformation
is Spinks v. Riebold.30 The employee had agreed to a covenant restricting
post-employment competition in a tri-state area, but at the time of -the cessa-
tion of employment the employer's business covered only portions of Texas.
Acknowledging that the parties intended a reasonable restraint, the court
stated:
[A]t the time the contract was entered into, so far as we know, it may
have been contemplated by the parties that [the employer's] business
would eventually cover the entire three states, and if that had been
true at the time [the employee] severed his employment . . . then the
provision . . . would not necessarily have been unreasonable.8 1
Finding that the tri-state restraint was unreasonable, the court reformed the
agreement to provide for a restraint only in those areas in which the em-
ployer's business was carried on at the time employment was terminated:
that is, it conformed -the restraint to what turned out to be reasonable years
after the covenant was executed.
B. Consideration and the Ancillary Rule
Every employee covenant has inevitable effects which in some degree op-
pose community values, that a man should not be obliged to barter away
his personal freedom and that any degree of servitude is distasteful. But, the
need for efficient business organization must be balanced against these con-
siderations. Efficient division of labor and specialization cannot take place
unless the risk of loss of entrusted information can be minimized. Because
each employee covenant involves a conflict of social and political maxims of
freedom and economic maxims of efficiency it is not in every situation that
an employee covenant can be enforceable. The courts will not allow a man
to barter his economic freedom unless the purpose of his doing so can be
justified as a protection of his employer's economic interests. The Restate-
ment of Contracts, in its "ancillary rule," recognizes only two situations in
which that purpose is present: in the contract for employment and during
employment.3 2  The Restatement rule is valid insofar as it goes, provided
business risks are present or contemplated. A recent case3 3 which held void
a covenant made ancillary to an existing employment (valid under the Re-
29. The principal case is not such an agreement. At the time of the settlement,
Justin was, or should have been, fully aware of what protection was warranted and,
therefore, reasonable. See the discussion at notes 49-52 in!ra and accompanying text.
30. 310 S.W.2d 668 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1958), error ref.
31. Id. at 670.
32. The Restatement states than an employee covenant is unreasonable and therefore
unenforceable if it "is not ancillary . . . to an existing employment or contract of em-
ployment." RESTATEMENT § 515(e).
33. McCombs v. McClelland, 223 Ore. 475, 354 P.2d 311 (1960).
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statement's ancillary rule) is illustrative. The defendant had worked for the
plaintiff for a period of years when she signed an employee covenant. The
court held 'that even though the covenant was made pursuant to an existing
employment, there was no sufficient consideration in that the employer failed
to promise any future employment, increased wages or increased responsi-
bility, and the covenant was, therefore, void.3 4  Essentially, the transaction
involved did not give rise to any risks on the part of -the employer. Thus, the
"ancillary rule" can be viewed as a matter of consideration. For a valid
covenant not to compete, the consideration must be more than "adequate;"
it must be "special"-a transfer of some interest worthy of protection by
the covenant.35
In employee situations the usual interests worthy of protection are trade
secrets which will 'be learned in ,the course of future employment, 6 but there
are others. For example, -in DeLong Corp. v. Lucas3 7 a settlement agree-
ment provided that the defendant would not engage in the sale of oil equip-
ment in competition with the plaintiff. The court held that the relinquish-
ment of the plaintiff's cause of action by the settlement agreement was suf-
ficient consideration -for the covenant not to compete in 'that the covenant
was necessary to protect the plaintiff's trade secrets which were no longer
protected by the right to sue his former employee.38
Construing the "ancillary rule" as a rule of consideration to be applied to
employee covenants, a more precise statement of the rule would be that a
covenant in restraint is valid only if incidental to the transfer of some interest
worthy of protection by the covenant. 39 If no "protectable interest" is ex-
changed or is promised to be exchanged, the covenant is void.40
II. JUSTIN BELT CO. V. YOST
It is settled law in Texas that reasonable covenants in restraint of 'trade
34. 354 P.2d at 315.
35. Corbin implies that there must be "special" consideration for employee cove-
nants. "Therefore we must examine the extent and character of the consideration re-
ceived by the promisor, even though we do not do so in ordinary contract cases." 6A
CORBIN § 1395, at 108 (emphasis added). See also note 18 supra.
36. RESTATEMENT § 515(e).
37. 176 F. Supp. 104 (S.D.N.Y. 1959), affd, 278 F.2d 804 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
364 U.S. 833 (1960).
38. 176 F. Supp. at 121; accord, Worldwide Pharmacal Distrib. Co. v. Kolkey, 5
Ill. App. 2d 201, 125 N.E.2d 309 (1955) (The employee sued the employer for wrongful
discharge and breach of contract to transfer stock. The settlement provided that the
employer would pay the employee $4,000 and the employee agreed not to engage in the
"bust developing" business in competition with the employer. The employee later mar-
keted a competitive product. The court held that considering the "special circum-
stances," the covenant was valid.); Novelty Bias Binding Co. v. Shevrin, 342 Mass. 714,
175 N.E.2d 374 (1961) (restrictive covenant in post-employment restitution agreement
held valid where restitution was of goods stolen during employment); Chenault v. Otis
Eng'r Corp., 423 S.W.2d 377 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1967), error ref. n.r.e.
(covenant not to compete incidental to a leave of absence agreement held valid).
39. This makes the Restatement provision incomplete, see note 32 supra, but it is
in accord with the statement by Professor Williston: "[Glenerally it is only in cases
where the restrictive promise is ancillary to some other transaction that its validity has
been upheld." 14 WILLISTON § 1636, at 96 (3d ed. 1972).
40. Compare Smith v. Kousiakis, 172 S.W. 586 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1914),
with the cases cited in notes 37-38 supra.
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will be enforced by injunction, 41 and in determining what is "reasonable"
Texas 'has traditionally followed the majority of jurisdictions.4 2  Justin has
taken the Texas law a step further in two instances, first by allowing enforce-
ment of a contract executed after termination of the employment, and sec-
ondly by allowing reformation of a covenant originally unlimited in time or
area.
The covenant in question was executed as part of a settlement agreement
between Yost, Souder, and Justin, and was not dissimilar from -those disputed
in earlier cases in Massachusetts, 43 Illinois, 44 and New York.45  The con-
tract, of which the restrictive covenant was part, extinguished Justin's right
to sue the two employees for wrongful activities arising out of their employ-
ment. Such an agreement certainly gave rise to a legitimate, protectable
interest, closely related to the previous employment,46 the risk of future con-
spiracy or breach of confidential relations. The restrictive covenant was
directed at protecting such an interest; however, it incorporated unreason-
able and unlimited restrictions.
As discussed previously,4 7 the reasoning behind allowing reformation of
covenants in restraint of trade is a result of the uncertainty that generally
prevailed at the time the covenant was written. Taking notice of that un-
certainty, the court will enforce what is considered the purpose of the agree-
ment, a restraint which will adequately protect the employer without undue
harm to the employee.48  Texas has traditionally been liberal in allowing
reformation, going so far as to say that it will be allowed even if a covenant
is unreasonable in both time and area. 49  But, in all previous Texas cases
the covenants which were reformed were executed at a time when neither
party knew or could have known what would turn out to be reasonable.5 0
Conversely, Justin knew or should have known what a reasonable restraint
41. The earliest case is Gates v. Hooper, 90 Tex. 563, 39 S.W. 1079 (1897), dis-
cussed in 3 TEXAS L. REV. 337 (1925). The first case enforcing an employee covenant
is Patterson v. Crabb, 51 S.W. 870 (Tex. Civ. App. 1899), error dismissed w.o.j.
42. See note 20 supra. The court in Justin did not speak to the issue of reasonable-
ness, but the court of civil appeals set forth several tests, citing Williston and the Re-
statement. Yost v. Justin Belt Co., 488 S.W.2d 850, 853-55 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort
Worth 1972), rev'd, 502 S.W.2d 681 (Tex. 1973).
43. Novelty Bias Binding Co. v. Shevrin, 342 Mass. 714, 175 N.E.2d 374 (1961);
see note 38 supra.
44. Worldwide Pharmacal Distrib. Co. v. Kolkey, 5 Ill. App. 2d 201, 125 N.E.2d
309 (1955); see note 38 supra.
45. Delong Corp. v. Lucas, 176 F. Supp. 104 (S.D.N.Y. 1959), aff'd, 278 F.2d 804
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 833 (1960); see text accompanying note 37 supra.
46. See note 40 supra and accompanying text.
47. See notes 24-26 supra and accompanying text.
48. See note 19 supra and accompanying text.
49. Weatherford Oil Tool Co. v. Campbell, 161 Tex. 310, 340 S.W.2d 950 (1960);
Lewis v. Krueger, Hutchinson & Overton Clinic, 153 Tex. 363, 269 S.W.2d 798 (1954);
Spinks v. Riebold, 310 S.W.2d 668 (Tex. Civ. App.-E1 Paso 1958), error ref. The
statement of approval in all these cases was contained in dicta, because none of the cases
involved a covenant which was unreasonable in both time and area.
50. See cases cited in note 49 supra. It should also be noted that "unreasonable"
and "unlimited" are not synonymous. Unreasonableness depends upon the facts of each
individual case, while employee covenants which are completely unlimited are generally
unreasonable as a matter of law. See Lewis v. Kreuger, Hutchinson & Overton Clinic,
153 Tex. 363, 365-66, 269 S.W.2d 798, 800 (1954).
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would be, for, at the time of the contract, the parties' employment relation-
ship was at an end. 5'
The court in Justin did not follow the traditional reformation rationale
and allowed an unlimited restraint to be converted into a reasonable one.
If the case is construed strictly, as holding that the force of a judicial settle-
ment will be upheld regardless of negligence or overreaching by one of the
parties, it would be a novel but sufferable addition to the law of compromise
and settlement. However, if the case is construed so as to apply to employee
covenants in general, it fails to comply with what has been, and should be,
the law. 52 As a general precept reformation has been utilized to cause the
contract to reflect the intent of the parties. In contrast, the courts usually
reform employee covenants so as to be consistent with the purpose of the
covenant rather than the intent of the parties which is often unclear when
the covenant is entered.5 3 Where the purpose is clear, and there is no
ground for uncertainty, reformation is improper.14
III. CONCLUSION
The Texas employer can with little difficulty draft a covenant to be in-
cluded in his employment contracts which will soften the risk of injury due
to departing employees. Likewise, such a covenant could ,be agreed upon
during the term of employment.5 5 The employer who has failed to protect
himself contractually during 'the term of employment is left only with the
employee torts in his arsenal of remedies.50 Justin offers an alternative to
'the litigation of tort actions via the judicial settlement. An employee cov-
enant, included in a settlement agreement, will protect the interests of the
employer, and will protect the employee from 'the expense of a lawsuit.
The Supreme Court of Texas in Justin has allowed reformation of an in-
strument, where at the time of the instrument's writing there was no mistake
and no uncertainty. The court chose to write a new and different contract
to replace a contract which the parties knew or should have known to have
51. See Blake 683.
52. In Lewis v. Kreuger, Hutchinson & Overton Clinic, 153 Tex. 363, 269 S.W.2d
798 (1954), the court reformed an employee covenant totally unlimited in time. It was,
however, the opinion of the court that: "Even though it might be interpreted as promis-
ing never to practice in Lubbock County . . ." the contract lent itself to the construction
that the parties "intended the restriction to prevail a reasonable length of time only."
Id. at 366, 269 S.W.2d at 800. Chief Justice Calvert, concurring, questioned the wisdom
of the court's rewriting both time and space provisions. He answered: "I think not;
and yet we have taken the first step in that direction." Id. at 367, 269 S.W.2d at 800-
01.
53. See note 30 supra and accompanying text.
54. See generally 13 WILLISTON § 1549 (3d ed. 1970).
55. Of course, the employer must transfer or promise to transfer something worthy
of protection by the covenant. See notes 33-34 supra and accompanying text. A prom-
ise of increased wages would not be enough. 6A CORBIN § 1395.
56. See note 4 supra.
57. Justin states that contracts reasonable in time and area will be upheld when they
are ancillary to "some permissible transaction." Justin Belt Co. v. Yost, 502 S.W.2d
681, 684 (Tex. 1973). It is submitted that the term "permissible transaction" was in-
tended by the court to include only transactions which involve a transfer of protectable
interests, not "any transaction." See 6A CORBIN § 1395. See also note 39 supra and
accompanying text, the relinquishment of an employer's cause of action for wrongful use
of inforrnation obtained durin previous employment involves such a transfer.
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been unreasonable at its inception. Under such circumstances, Justin should
not be construed to apply to employee covenants in general. The intent of
the parties in setting forth the terms of the employee covenant was clear,
but the covenant did not fairly serve the purpose of the settlement agree-
ment. Justin should be construed to apply only to the law of compromise
and settlement, holding that the purpose of a settlement agreement will be
enforced to the extent that it is reasonable, irregardless of the parties' intent
in setting forth the terms of the settlement.
B. Prater Monning, III
Houdaille Industries, Inc. v. Cunningham:
Discovery of Experts' Reporfs in Texas
Houdaille Industries brought suit against Southwestern Laboratories in a
Texas district court, alleging negligent performance of a paving design con-
tract. Southwestern moved under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 167 to dis-
cover certain reports and photographs which were made or taken by experts
employed by Houdaille to investigate the cause for the failure of the paving.
Because of Houdaille's objections to Southwestern's motion, trial judge Cun-
ningham conducted an in camera review of the materials sought and or-
dered that two items be returned to Houdaille as privileged work product
materials. Houdaille was ordered to produce three reports and a group of
photographs for Southwestern's inspection. Believing that these materials
were protected from discovery since the experts were not to testify as wit-
nesses in chief,' Houdaille sought a writ of mandamus from the Texas Su-
preme Court to compel the trial judge to vacate his discovery order. At this
point, Judge Cunningham voluntarily stayed his order so that issuance of
the writ would be unnecessary. Held, order modified: The reports of ex-
perts who will not testify in any witness capacity are protected from discov-
ery under the privilege proviso of rule 167, but experts' photographs unat-
tached to a report are discoverable, regardless of whether or not the expert
will testify. Houdaille Industries, Inc. v. Cunningham, 502 S.W.2d 544
(Tex. 1973).
I. DISCOVERY AND THE WORK PRODUCT LIMITATION
As the federal and state systems began to stress the notice function of
pleading, pre-trial discovery emerged as a means to clarify issues and to de-
1. Houdaille unsuccessfully argued that rule 167 permits the discovery of the re-
ports of experts who will testify in support of a party's case in chief, but protects the
reports of experts who will be used only to rebut an opposing theory.
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termine facts. The emphasis changed from one of secrecy, with a premium
on cunning, ,to one of openness, with a stress on fairness.2 Nevertheless, there
still remained a basic tension "between the desire for orderly, efficient liti-
gation within the context of a strict adversary system"'3 and the remnants of
the "sporting game" theory 4 of justice. One aspect of this tension was re-
solved arguably in favor of the sporting theory by the United States Supreme
Court in Hickman v. Taylor.5  Hickman considered the extent to which a
party could discover statements of witnesses, or other information obtained
by an adverse party's counsel in preparation for possible litigation after a
claim had arisen. The Court concluded that this information, which had
been reluctantly termed "work product" by the Ninth Circuit,6 was not dis-
coverable absent a showing of necessity. In the sporting tradition, a law-
yer's work and ingenuity would be granted a qualified privilege which would
be lost only in "a rare situation."'7 Essential to the Court's analysis was its
perception of the purposes for discovery: "[T]o narrow and clarify the ba-
sic issues . . . and . . . [to ascertain] the facts, or information as to the
existence or whereabouts of facts, relative to those issues." Given these pol-
icy justifications, the attorney's personal strategies or impressions would
rarely, if ever, be discoverable, since they would not further the discovery
goals, -and also would contravene the policy behind the "orderly prosecution
and defense of legal claims." 9
Hickman was the basis for the trial preparation section of Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 26.'0 In order for documents or other tangible materials
"prepared in anticipation of litigation by a party or his representative"" to be
discoverable, the opposing party must show that he "has substantial need
of the materials in the preparation of his case and that he is unable without
2. In United States v. Procter & Gamble Co., 356 U.S. 677, 682 (1958), the United
States Supreme Court reasoned that discovery helps to "make a trial less a game of
blindman's bluff and more a fair contest with the basic issues and facts disclosed to the
fullest practicable extent." In Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 501 (1947), the Court
indicated that "civil trials in the federal courts no longer need be carried on in the dark."
See generally Pike & Willis, The New Federal Deposition-Discovery Procedure: 1, 38
COLUM. L. REV. 1179 (1938).
3. Federal Discovery Rules: Effects of the 1970 Amendments, 8 COLUM. J. OF
LAW & Soc. PROBs. 623, 624 (1972).
4. LaFrance, Work Product Discovery: A Critique, 68 DIcK. L. REV. 351, 356(1964); see Martin v. Reynolds Metals Corp., 297 F.2d 49, 56 (9th Cir. 1961).
5. 329 U.S. 495 (1947).
6. 153 F.2d 212, 223 (9th Cir. 1945).
7. 329 U.S. at 513.
8. Id. at 501; see American Oil Co. v. Pennsylvania Petroleum Prods. Co., 23
F.R.D. 680 (D.R.I. 1959); Great Am. Ins. Co. v. Murray, 437 S.W.2d 264, 267 (Tex.
1969), citing 2A W. BARRON & A. HOLTZOFF, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 641(Wright ed. 1961); Long, Discovery and Experts Under the Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure, 39 WASH. L. REV. 665 (1964).
9. 329 U.S. at 510. The Court refused to couch its analysis in terms of the attor-
ney-client privilege, but instead stressed the potential demoralizing effects which such
discovery would have on the legal system and on the lawyer's ability to serve the needs
of his clients.
10. FED. R. Cv. P. 26(b)(3).
11. Though Hickman involved work product obtained directly by counsel, Alltmont
v. United States, 177 F.2d 971, 976 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 967 (1950), ex-
tended the Hickman reasoning to "all statements of prospective witnesses which a party
has obtained for his trial counsel's use." Rule 26(b)(3) follows the Alltmont logic,
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undue hardship to obtain the substantial equivalent of the materials by other
means."'1 2 As to mental impressions or legal theories of an attorney, the
rule requires that the court protect against such disclosure and thus elimi-
nates the possibility for discovery which was postulated in Hickman.'3
The trend in Texas, and in many other states, followed the general pro-
gression of the federal rules, 14 but with several specific distinctions. Federal
rule 26, for example, establishes the scope for all forms of discovery and re-
quires a showing of relevancy as a prerequisite to discovery. In Texas, rule
186a' 5 establishes the scope for depositions and interrogatories, but does not
set the limitations for discovery under rule 167, which deals with production
of documents and other tangible materials.16 Furthermore, rule 167 re-
quires a showing of good cause 17 rather than mere relevancy and also speci-
fies that the material sought must contain or be reasonably calculated to
lead to evidence.' 8 Finally, both rules 671 and 186a contain unique re-
strictive provisos. Under rule 167, the rights of discovery do not extend to
"written communications passing between agents or representatives . . . of
either party to the suit, or to other communications between any party and
his agents, [or] representatives . . ." where made subsequent to ,the origina-
tion of the claim and in connection with it. 19 Rule 186a contains a similar
provision, as well as one preventing examinations from reaching the attor-
ney's work product. The Texas rules allow no exceptions to permit disclo-
sure of such matters, even upon a showing of substantial need and undue
hardship. Having taken the basic framework of the federal rules, the Texas
rules makers went a step farther by making the work product privilege abso-
lute. 20
II. EXTENSION OF THE WORK PRODUCT PRIVILEGE TO
EXPERTS' REPORTS
Following the same reasoning as that used to support the work product
12. FED. R. Cv. P. 26(b)(3).
13. See note 9 supra and accompanying text.
14. Thirty-four states, including Texas, have substantially adopted the general fed-
eral system of discovery. Note, Discovery of Expert Information, 47 N.C.L. REV. 401,
402 (1969).
15. TEX. R. Civ. P. 186a.
16. Rule 186a is titled "Scope of Examinations," but by its own words it seems lim-
ited to examinations such as depositions or interrogatories. TEX. R. Civ. P. 168, for
example, which covers interrogatories to parties, is expressly limited by rule 186a. Rule
167, on the other hand, makes no reference to, and is apparently not governed by, rule
186a.
17. The good cause requirement was eliminated from the analogous FED. R. Civ.
P. 34 in 1970.
18. Before the 1973 amendment, rule 167 required that the material sought contain
evidence. For a discussion of the 1973 amendments to the Texas rules of discovery,
see Keith, Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, 36 TEX. B.J, 401, 403-08 (1973).
19. TEX. R. Civ. P. 167.
20. Of the four states which were cited in Note, supra note 14, at 402, as having
the most restrictive work product provisions, only two, Texas and Pennsylvania, still
have such rules. PA. R. Civ. P. 4011d forbids all discovery which "would disclose the
existence or location of reports, memoranda, statements, information or other things
made or secured by any person or party in anticipation of litigation . . . other than in-
formation as to the identity or whereabouts of witnesses."
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privilege, many federal and state courts considered reports of experts as simi-
larly privileged matters prepared in anticipation of trial by representatives
of a party.2' The privilege was based on either a work product, 22 attorney-
client privilege, 23 or unfairness 24 analysis. Federal rule 26(b)(4)(A) re-
jected these rationales as they related to the discovery of experts whom a
party expects to call at trial. 23 The special treatment of testifying experts was
justified as the only way to assure that the other party's advocate could en-
gage the expert in an effective and intelligent cross-examination. 26 The
rule allows a party 'to discover the facts or opinions of a non-testifying
expert only upon "a showing of exceptional circumstances under which it is
impracticable for the party seeking discovery to obtain facts or opinions on
the same subject by other means."'27  Thus, the federal courts are to engage
in balancing tests to assure that the work product and fairness policies are
not contravened.
The Texas rules are more restrictive than the federal rules in regard to the
treatment of experts' reports. The scope of examinations under rule 186a
does not extend to the "mental impressions and opinions of experts used
solely for consultation and who will not be witnesses in the case."' 28 Simi-
21. See 4 J. MOORE & J. LUCAS, MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE % 26.66 (2d ed. 1974);
C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: CIVIL § 2029 (1970);
Friedenthal, Discovery and Use of an Adverse Party's Expert Information, 14 STAN. L.
REV. 455 (1962); Rylaarsdam, Disclosure of Lay and Expert Witness Reports-Discovery
vs. The Work Product and Attorney-Client Privileges, 48 L.A. BAR BULL. 336 (1973).
22. See, e.g., Carpenter-Trant Drilling Co. v. Magnolia Petroleum Corp., 23 F.R.D.
257 (D. Neb. 1959); Empire Box Corp. v. Illinois Cereal Mills, 47 Del. 283, 90 A.2d
672 (Super. Ct. 1952); Ford Motor Co. v. Havee, 123 So. 2d 572 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1960).
23. See, e.g., Cold Metal Process Co. v. Aluminum Co. of America, 7 F.R.D. 684
(D. Mass. 1947); City & County of San Francisco v. Superior Ct., 37 Cal. 2d 227, 231
P.2d 26 (1951). But see Sachs v. Aluminum Co. of America, 167 F.2d 570 (6th Cir.
1948).
24. See, e.g., Schuyler v. United Air Lines, 10 F.R.D. 111, 113 (M.D. Pa. 1950),
a!f'd, 188 F.2d 968 (3d Cir. 1951); Lewis v. United Air Lines Transp. Corp., 32 F.
Supp. 21, 23 (W.D. Pa. 1940) (in which the court regarded the expert's report as being
endowed with property rights); McCarthy v. Palmer, 29 F. Supp. 585, 586 (E.D.N.Y.
1939), aff'd, 113 F.2d 721 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 311 U.S. 680 (1940). But see Miller
v. Harpster, 392 P.2d 21 (Alas. 1964). In some cases opinions and conclusions have
been distinguished from factual aspects of the report. See, e.g., Walsh v. Reynolds Me-
tals Co., 15 F.R.D. 376, 378 (D.N.J. 1954); cf. Comment, Discovery of the Medical
Malpractice Expert, 6 WILLAMETTE L.J. 315 (1970). Many of these cases expressed
concern about one party obtaining the report of an expert which has been paid for by
his opponent, but rule 26(b)(4)(C) provides for the party seeking discovery to pay for
or to share the expenses. (Under TEx. R. Civ. P. 186b the court may make a similar
order.) The unfairness argument has had its effect on rule 26(b)(4)(B), since the
fairly heavy burden of showing substantial need and undue hardship is placed on the
party seeking the report of a non-testifying expert. See Advisory Committee Notes to
Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Relating to Discovery,
48 F.R.D. 487, 504 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Committee Notes].
25. As to the problem of knowing in advance which witnesses will be called, an easy
solution would be to grant the opposing party an extended period for discovery or a con-
tinuance whenever a party decides to call an expert whose report has not been produced
previously.
26. Committee Notes 503.
27. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4) (B). Under no circumstances may a party obtain the
names or opinions of experts who are only informally consulted. Committee Notes 504.
28. TEX. R. Civ. P. 186a. Under rule 186a, an opposing party may utilize discovery
to secure the names of experts "having knowledge of relevant facts," unless the courts
somehow rule that this information falls within the scope of the work product restric-
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larly, under rule 167 a party may not discover communications between a
party and his representative prepared in anticipation of litigation. Unlike
the federal rules, the Texas rules make no allowance for exceptions to cover
special circumstances.
Until recently, Texas courts have treated the reports of all experts as
privileged communications between a party and his representatives. 29  In
State v. Ashworth 0 the Texas Supreme Court held that the written report of
a state-hired appraiser in an eminent domain case was immune from discov-
ery. The court indicated that the appraiser could 'be called at trial by the
party who did not hire him, although that course would obviously involve a
great risk since the expert's silence would not necessarily mean that his re-
port was favorable to the non-hiring party.
The restrictive nature of discovery in Texas was conclusively demonstrated
in the case of Ex parte Ladon.3 1 In Ladon the Texas Supreme Court ruled
that a list of passengers, which was compiled by a bus driver after an acci-
dent, was privileged as material procured for the purpose of investigation
and defense. The driver was considered an agent for the bus company, a
potential party to litigation.32
In 1971 the Texas rules were amended to eliminate the Ladon situation,
by making the identity and location of a potential witness or party discover-
able.33 In 1973 the rules were further amended to permit the discovery of
the names and reports of testifying experts.34  The question of how these
modifications affected the discoverability of the reports of non-testifying ex-
perts was a matter of some speculation. 35 Rule 186a speaks specifically to
this issue as it relates to discovery examinations, since it absolutely protects
the mental impressions and opinions of non-testifying experts. Rule 167,
however, does not make specific reference to experts in its work product
section, so the privilege accorded to the reports of non-testifying experts has
been somewhat unclear.
tions. Note that the rule 186a proviso protects from discovery the mental impressions
and opinions of consulting experts, but it does not seem to cover examining an expert
or a party as to facts within the expert's knowledge.
29. See, e.g., Hodges v. State, 403 S.W.2d 207 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1966),
error ref. n.r.e., and Shirley v. Dalby, 384 S.W.2d 362 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana
1964), error ref. n.r.e., both condemnation cases in which the reports of persons em-
ployed by the state to investigate land values in the area were ruled immune from dis-
covery by the condemnees; Munden v. Chambless, 315 S.W.2d 355 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Dallas 1958), error ref. n.r.e.; cf. Gass v. Baggerly, 332 S.W.2d 426 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Dallas 1960), wherein the court relied on the discovery restrictions as to written com-
munications between a party and his representative to prohibit the introduction of a de-
fendant's written statement at trial.
30. 484 S.W.2d 565 (Tex. 1972).
31. 325 S.W.2d 121 (Tex. 1959).
32. Accord, Ex parte Hanlon, 406 S.W.2d 204 (Tex. 1966), which involved a three-
car accident where one car fled the scene. The plaintiff attempted to secure the name
of the missing driver from the claims adjuster for the company that insured the second
car. The court held the identity of the driver not discoverable, citing Ladon for author-
ity.
33. TEX. R. Civ. P. 167; TEx. R. Civ. P. 186a.
34. Id.




III. HOUDAILLE INDUSTRIES, INC. V. CUNNINGHAM
As relator3 seeking a writ of mandamus,3 7 Houdaille provided the im-
petus which led the Texas Supreme Court to clarify the state's position in re-
gard to the discovery of experts' reports. The court concluded that the re-
ports of non-testifying experts were absolutely protected under rule 167, but
found that the reports of rebuttal witnesses and photographs unattached to
reports were not prbtected from discovery.
Privilege and Testifying Experts. The court determined that the 1973
amendments to rules 167 and 186a liberalized the rules only to the extent
of permitting a limited exception to the work product provisos by permitting
discovery of the reports of -testifying experts. As Houdaille persuasively ar-
gued, the district court's holding that the reports of non-testifying experts were
not protected under rule 167 would have the effect of importing the federal
rule into Texas "despite the clear decision of the Texas rule makers not to
adopt Federal Rules."38 Regrettably, however, the court did not consider the
obvious question of why rule 167 does not expressly cover the subject of non-
testifying experts, while rule 186a specifically prohibits the "disclosure of the
mental impressions and opinions of experts used solely for consultation."3 9
Had it considered the policy justifications behind the discovery of experts' re-
ports, the court might have concluded that rule 167's proviso was not meant
to apply to the reports of non-testifying experts. Rather than doing so, the
court reverted to the work product treatment of experts' reports and held that
the reports of non-testifying experts were privileged as written communica-
tions between a party and his representative. 40
If adequate preparation for cross-examination were the only justification
for discovery of the reports of non-testifying experts, there would be no rea-
son to permit the discovery of the reports of non-testifying experts, and the
Houdaille court would have been correct in its strict analysis of rule 167.
There are, however, several other purposes for discovery to which the court
did not refer. First, opinions of experts may 'be regarded as evidence
necessary to establish material facts. 41  One party may hire all of the ex-
36. The term is used to refer to the person upon whose instance certain writs are
issued.
37. TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 1733 (1962). Many Texas cases have admitted
the propriety of the writ of mandamus as a means to secure review of discovery orders,
since they are interlocutory, and hence, not appealable. See, e.g., Commercial Travelers
Life Ins. Co. v. Spears, 484 S.W.2d 577 (Tex. 1972); State v. Ashworth, 484 S.W.2d
565 (Tex. 1972); Russell v. Young, 452 S.W.2d 434 (Tex. 1970); Maresca v. Marks,
362 S.W.2d 299 (Tex. 1962); Crane v. Tunks, 328 S.W.2d 434 (Tex. 1959). Respond-
ent Southwestern Laboratories urged in its brief that mandamus was improperly sought,
since the trial judge had issued a valid order by exercising, but not abusing, his discre-
tion. Respondent's Brief in Opposition to Mandamus at 3-7, Houdaille Indus., Inc. v.
Cunningham, 502 S.W.2d 544 (Tex. 1973). In support of the position that a writ of
mandamus will not lie unless a discretionary order of the trial judge is void, see State
Bd. of Ins. v. Betts, 308 S.W.2d 846 (Tex. 1958). The court, however, rejected the ar-
gument that mandamus was improper with a brief statement that the court's authority
was "well settled." 502 S.W.2d at 546. For a general discussion of the mandamus
power of the Texas Supreme Court, see Norvell & Sutton, The Original Writ of Man-
damus in the Supreme Court of Texas, 1 ST. MARY'S L.J. 177 (1969).
38. Realtor's Brief for Mandamus at 24.
39. TEX. R. Civ. P. 186a.
40. 502 S.W.2d at 548.
41, Friedenthal, supra note 21, at 473.
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perts in a given field, 42 and thereby effectively prevent his opponent from ever
hearing an expert's findings without calling him to the stand.43  Second, the
openness which is a goal of modem discovery is contravened by the suppres-
sion of such reports. If experts' reports may be regarded as evidence, one
party is being permitted to withhold relevant evidence at the other party's ex-
pense. 44 On the other hand, one must be somewhat persuaded by the argu-
ment that it is unfair to open up the report of an expert which was secured
through a party's own funds and diligence. This is the type of situation where
the courts should be permitted to fulfill a balancing function by weighing the
purposes 'and need for the particular discovery against any unfairness
which it might present. Unfortunately, the Texas rule, as interpreted by
the court in Houdaille, does not allow for such flexibility.
Because of the basis for its opinion, the court did not reach the issue of
Southwestern's justifications in seeking the reports. The fifteen-month time
lag between the notice to Southwestern's agent of the paving's failure and
its removal45 represents the time in which both parties could have investi-
gated the cause for the failure. Southwestern apparently made no effort to
employ its own experts to make such an investigation. 46  Unless its
justification was that there were no other competent experts available, dis-
covery in this situation seemingly would have rewarded Southwestern's dila-
toriness in pursuing its own investigation. In fact, it is unlikely that South-
western would have been able to procure these reports even under the liberal
federal rules, for although it may have been able to establish a substantial
need for the reports, it probably would have been unable to show that it
could not have obtained a substantial equivalent without undue hardship.47
Experts as Rebuttal Witnesses. The court further held that the reports
of experts who would appear in any witness capacity were discoverable.
Again, the court's analysis was based on a strict rule interpretation. The
fact that rule 167 referred to witnesses without distinguishing rebuttal wit-
nesses from witnesses in chief was held to mean that no such distinction was
implied. 48 Houdaille urged that the primary rationale for discovery of ex-
pert witnesses-to prepare for effective cross-examinations---does not ex-
tend to rebuttal witnesses because counsel obviously would be familiar with
his own defensive theories, the only aspects of the case which the expert
42. This is a situation which would be especially likely to occur when the expertise
sought is in an esoteric subject.
43. It is also unlikely that a party could discover the names of non-testifying experts
hired by his opponent, for rule 186a requires only that the names of persons having
"knowledge of relevant facts" (emphasis added) be revealed in a deposition.
44. See United States v. Meyer, 398 F.2d 66 (9th Cir. 1968); Security Indus., Inc.
v. Fickus, 439 P.2d 172 (Alas. 1968). But see United States v. Certain Parcels of Land,
Etc., 15 F.R.D. 224 (S.D. Cal. 1954); State v. Biggers, 360 S.W.2d 516 (Tex. 1962).
45. The Southwestern agent was notified on April 15, 1971, written notice was
mailed to Southwestern in February 1972, and the paving was totally removed by Sep-
tember 1972. Relator's Brief for Mandamus at 3, 4.
46. Id. at 4.
47. Furthermore, it is unlikely that Southwestern could have met the good cause re-
quirement under rule 167 had the court reached this issue.
48. 502 S.W.2d at 548.
1974] NOTES
SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
could discuss.49 The court rejected that contention and again opted for strict
interpretation over policy analysis.
Photographs as Privileged Materials. The final aspect of the case dealt
with Houdaille's argument that photographs taken by its non-testifying ex-
perts were protected from discovery under rule 167 as written communica-
tions prepared by a party's representative. 50 Without citing a single author-
ity, the court concluded that photographs are not written communications
and hence are discoverable.5 ' Justice Pope based his dissent 52 exclusively
on this point, persuasively urging that photographs53 are both written and
communicative. Texas courts have accepted the written character of pho-
tographs in cases interpreting Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 281, 4 under
which jurors may take "written evidence" into the jury room. Based on this
analysis and the important fact that rule 167 protects not only written com-
munications between the representatives of a party, but also shields from dis-
covery "other communications between a party and his representatives," it
seems that the rationale for the court's decision must 'have been that photo-
graphs were deemed to be non-communicative. Texas courts have never
ruled directly on the communicative nature of photographs,55 but it seems
apparent that photographs are just as capable of conveying ideas as are
words.5 Again, although the court did not address the policy arguments be-
hind its holding, it seems illogical to protect the reports of non-testifying ex-
perts while denying the same protection to photographs. The outcome on
this point does serve the openness policy which discovery seeks to further,
yet it seems inconsistent with the approach taken in regard to experts' reports.
Finally, it is apparent that the potential effect of the court's ruling in this
area can be diminished to a point of insignificance if expert photographers
attach a report, no matter how brief or simplistic, to their photographs. Ac-
cording to the court's ruling,57 the photographs would then become part of
the report, and, if the expert were not testifying, they would be protected
under the rule 167 proviso.
49. Relator's Brief for Mandamus at 29.
50. Southwestern argued unsuccessfully that the experts employed by Houdaille were
not its "repiesentatives." Respondent's Brief in Opposition to Mandamus at 13-14. Un-
der the federal rules, discovery of photographs has been generally allowed. In state
courts discovery of photographs has often been denied, sometimes on the grounds of
privilege. See Suezaki v. Superior Ct., 58 Cal. 2d 166, 373 P.2d 432, 23 Cal. Rptr. 368
(1962); Stebelski v. Philadelpha Transp. Co., 6 Pa. D. & C.2d 627 (Phil. Co. No. 5
1956); Annot., 95 A.L.R.2d 1061 (1964).
51. 502 S.W.2d at 549.
52. Id.
53. The word photograph is, as Justice Pope pointed out, of Greek origin and means
light writing. 502 S.W.2d at 550.
54. See, e.g., Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. Crow, 148 Tex. 113, 115, 221 S.W.2d
235, 236 (1949); Dallas Ry. & Terminal Co. v. Durkee, 193 S.W.2d 222 (Tex. Civ. App.
-Dallas 1946), error ref. n.r.e. See also 2 C. McCoRMICK & R. RAY, TExAs LAW OF
EVIDENCE § 1466 (2d ed. 1956).
55. In Cutler v. Gulf States Util. Co., 361 S.W.2d 221, 224 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beau-
mont 1962), error ref. n.r.e., the court made passing reference to the privileged nature
of such photographs, but based its decision not to require their production on the fact
that the appellee first sought the materials six years after the origination of the claim.
56. See Cooper v. Mann, 273 Ala. 620, 143 So. 2d 637, 639 (1962), wherein com-
munication was defined to include "not only words uttered, but information conveyed
by any other means."




From its beginning as a tool of legal efficiency, discovery has reflected the
tensions between the various interests which the legal process has sought to
protect. A comparison of the federal rules with the discovery rules of Texas
reflects the different types of responses which rules makers have made in an
attempt to resolve these tensions. As Houdaille conclusively established,
the Texas rules are based on relatively narrow policy goals which do not re-
flect the scope and flexibility of the federal rules. Although the Texas posi-
tion is an arguably defensible one in terms of the risk of unfairness, it has
been carried to an illogical extreme by according an absolute privilege to work
product materials, including the reports of non-testifying experts. The hard
and fast rules have tied the hands of judges in making case-by-case determi-
nations of what is fair. Consequently, the courts have been forced to en-
gage in their own processes of fine line drawing and strict word analysis, as
epitomized in the Houdaille treatment of photographs. Unfortunately, how-
ever, unless the courts choose the path of policy analysis rather than that of
strict interpretation, the rules as they now stand will continue to be read nar-
rowly. The Texas Supreme Court apparently does not read rules 167 and
186a as vesting it with the ability to balance competing interests in this
area of law. In an apparent reaction to the many amgibuities of Hickman
and the vagaries of the federal rules, the Texas rules makers drew lines which
were too sharp in a procedural area where the issues are too complex to be
fitted logically into the narrow categories which the Texas rules suggest.
Barbara M.G. Lynn
Nathan Cummings: Tax Treatment of Repayments of
Insider Profits
Nathan Cummings, a director and shareholder of Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer,
sold 3,400 shares of MGM stock and reported the gain from the sale as a
long-term capital gain on his 1961 federal income tax return. Within a pe-
riod of six months Cummings repurchased a total of 3,400 shares of MGM
stock in a series of transactions. In 1962 the SEC notified MGM that un-
der section 16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,1 Cummings' profit
1. 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1971) provides in part:
For the purpose of preventing the unfair use of information which may
have been obtained by such beneficial owner, director, or officer by rea-
son of his relationship to the issuer, any profit realized by him from any
purchase and sale, or any sale and purchase, of any equity security of such
issuer (other than an exempted security) within any period of less than
six months, unless such security was acquired in good faith in connection
with a debt previously contracted, shall inure to and be recoverable by the
issuer, irrespective of any intention on the part of such beneficial owner,
director, or officer in entering into such transaction of holding the security




from the sale and repurchase was recoverable by the corporation as "in-
sider profit."'2  Cummings paid MGM the section 16(b) profit and de-
ducted the payment as an ordinary loss on his 1962 federal income tax re-
turn.3 The Commissioner of Internal Revenue determined that the payment
was a long-term capital loss, and Cummings contested this determination in
the Tax Court. Held: Cummings' payment to MGM of alleged insider
profit is an ordinary and necessary business expense under section 162(a) of
the Internal Revenue Code of 1954. Nathan Cummings, 61 T.C. 1 (1973). 4
I. HISTORY OF DEDUCTIONS FOR SECTION 16(b) PAYMENTS
Under section 16(b) of the 1934 Securities Exchange Act, a director, of-
ficer, or ten percent shareholder is an "insider,"5 and if he sells any of his
stock in the corporation and repurchases the same corporation's stock within
six months, the difference is recoverable by the corporation as insider prof-
it.6 The stated purpose of -the section is to prevent "the unfair use of in-
formation which may have been obtained by such beneficial owner."'7  Usu-
ally the section 16(b) "short-swing profit" is recoverable upon a showing
that the insider has engaged in the prohibited transactions, regardless of
whether he actually used special information.8 When a corporation is noti-
fied by the SEC of an alleged violation, the corporation must then sue the in-
2. The profit derived from a sale or purchase in violation of § 16(b) is computed
by matching the lowest purchases against the highest sales within six months. See, e.g.,
Smolowe v. Delendo Corp., 136 F.2d 231 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 751 (1943).
Actual gain on the original sale is irrelevant to calculation of § 16(b) profit, which may
he recovered even if the transactions produce an overall loss. Section 16(b) liability
also results when a sale is followed by a purchase within a six-month period. See gen.
erally 2 L. Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 1062-63 (2d ed. 1961), 3024-25 (Supp. 1969)
[hereinafter cited as Loss].
3. Cummings argued in the Tax Court that the deduction was proper either as a
business expense under INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 162(a), or as a business loss under
id. § 165(a).
4. The Tax Court was affirming its previous holding in Nathan Cummings, 60
T.C. 91 (1973); an appeal has been docketed in the Second Circuit, appeal docketed,
No. 74-1406 (2d Cir., Jan. 8, 1974).
5. Under § 16(b), a director, officer, or 10% beneficial owner must file with the
Commission an initial statement "of the amount of all equity securities of such issuer
of which he is the beneficial owner." 15 U.S.C. § 78p(a) (1971). Additionally, he
must file a report with the Commission within ten days of the end of any month in
which there has been a change in his ownership.
6. See note 2 supra.
7. 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1971). According to the Senate Committee which re-
ported the § 16(b) legislation, the purpose was to prevent directors, officers, and prin-
cipal stockholders of a corporation from trading securities on the basis of information
not available to the general public. S. REP. No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1934).
See also REPORT OF THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION ON PROPOSALS FOR
AMENDMENTS TO THE SECURITIES ACT OF 1933 AND THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF
1934, 77TH CONG., IST SESS. 13 (Comm. Print 1934), cited in Darrell, The Tax Treat-
ment of Payments Under Section 16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 64
HARV. L. REV. 80, 91 (1950); STOCK EXCHANGE PRACTICES, REPORT OF COMM. ON
BANKING AND CURRENCY, S. REP. No. 1455, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 55 (1934).
8. The traditional rule was stated in Smolowe v. Delendo Corp., 136 F.2d 231 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 751 (1943). "[Tlhe only remedy which its framers deemed
effective for this reform was the imposition of a liability based upon an objective
measure of proof." Id. at 235. In a few recent cases a more subjective approach to
§ 16(b) liability has been adopted. See, e.g., Kern County Land Co. v. Occidental Pe-
troleum Corp., 411 U.S. 582 (1973). See also Lowenfels, Section 16(b): A New Trend
in Regulating Insider Trading, 54 CORNELL L. REV. 45 (1968).
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sider to recover his section 16(b) profit9 or list the profit as a debt owed to
the corporation by the insider.10
The Tax Court initially disallowed any deduction for insider repayments
altogether. In William F. Davis, Jr." the Tax Court characterized section
16(b) as a "penalty provision," and held that to allow a deduction would
frustrate public policy by mitigating the deterrent effect of the section.' 2
Five years later, in Laurence M. Marks,13 the Tax Court changed its posi-
tion and allowed the deduction of the payment as an ordinary and necessary
business expense, finding that Marks' motivation in making the payment was
to protect his business reputation and to avoid publicity that would ad-
versely affect his business. Following the Marks decision, the IRS revoked
a 1951 ruling and issued Revenue Ruling 61-115, stating that a repayment
under section 16(b) is not a penalty; rather, the purpose of the section is
"to place the insider in the same position he would have occupied if he had
never engaged in the stock dealings."'1 4  The federal courts have since in-
terpreted section 16(b) as remedial, rather than penal in nature.15
II. THE CONTROVERSY BETWEEN THE TAX COURT AND THE
UNITED STATES COURTS OF APPEALS
Deductibility of the section 16(b) payment having been determined, the is-
sue has become whether the deduction should 'be against ordinary' 6 or capi-
tal gain. In the 1961 case of William L. Mitchell17 the Tax Court allowed
an ordinary business expense deduction under section 162(a), finding the
purpose of the section 16(b) payment to be the protection of the taxpayer's
business reputation, and avoidance of the embarrassment and expense of liti-
9. If the corporation does not institute suit within 60 days, or fails to prosecute
diligently, a stockholder may institute suit on behalf of the corporation. 15 U.S.C. §
78p(b) (1971).
10. A corporation must list in its proxy statement any debt owed to the corporation
by an officer or director. Section 16(b) liability has been included within this rule.
SEC Reg. 14 A, Item 7(e), Instr. 4, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-101 (1973).
11. 17 T.C. 549 (1951).
12. Id. at 556. The Internal Revenue Service issued a ruling adopting the reasoning
of Davis. I.T. 4069, 1952-1 CuM. BULL. 28.
13. 27 T.C. 464 (1956). Because liability under § 16(b) was questionable, the
court saw the issue as "whether allowance of the deduction would frustrate 'sharply de-
fined public policy,' " and determined that under the circumstances of the case, it would
not. Id. at 468-69.
14. 1961-1 CuM. BULL. 46, 48. The language of Revenue Ruling 61-115 may have
been an unfortunate choice of words. Section 16(b) was not a tax provision, and did
not specify the tax effect of a repayment. The legislative history of § 16(b) and the
stated purpose of the statute indicate that its purpose is to prevent the unfair use of in-
formation by insiders. There is no indication that § 16(b) was intended to have any
effect on the insider other than requiring him to reimburse the corporation and deterring
him from insider trading.
15. See, eng., Western Auto Supply Co. v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 348 F.2d 736, 740
(8th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 987 (1966); Booth v. Varian Associates, 334
F.2d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 961 (1965); Adler v. Klawans, 267
F.2d 840, 846-47 (2d Cir. 1959); Perfect Photo, Inc. v. Grabb, 205 F. Supp. 569, 571
(E.D. Pa. 1962).
16. A deduction against ordinary income has been allowed under INT. REV. CODE
OF 1954, § 162(a), which permits a deduction for ordinary and necessary business ex-
pense. Alternatively, § 165(a), which allows a deduction for business losses, has been
used as authority for allowing § 16(b) payments to be set off against ordinary income.




gation.' s The Commissioner argued that under the doctrine of Arrowsmith
v. Commissioner'9 the payment was so closely related to the earlier sale-pur-
chase transactions as to require characterization of the payment as a long-
term capital loss, since the profit from the sale was reported as a long-term
capital gain. 20 The Tax Court in Mitchell rejected the Commissioner's argu-
ment. Observing that only the sale, not the later purchase, had income tax
significance, the court found no relationship between the capital gain reported
on the sale and the later section 16(b) payment. The Tax Court 'held that
the section 16(b) payment had significance only under securities law, 2' and
thus it would be more appropriate to classify it as an ordinary business ex-
pense.
22
The Sixth Circuit reversed the Tax Court,28 finding Arrowsmith controlling,
particularly because of the interpretation given Arrowsmith by the United
States Supreme Court in United States v. Skelly Oil Co. 24 In Skelly Oil the
taxable income of the company was reduced by an oil depletion allowance. 25
When the taxpayer was required to refund part of the proceeds from the sale
of oil in a subsequent tax year, it deducted the refund as an ordinary loss
and the Commissioner disallowed the deduction. The Supreme Court held
that the taxpayer should not be allowed the equivalent of a double deduction,
and found the rationale for Arrowsmith "easy to see; if money was taxed at
a special lower rate when received, the taxpayer would be accorded an unfair
tax windfall if repayments were generally deductible from receipts taxable at
the higher rate applicable to ordinary income. ' ' 26  The Sixth Circuit held
18. 52 T.C. at 176.
19. 344 U.S. 6 (1952). The Tax Court explained the Arrowsmith requirement as
"the existence of an integral relationship between two taxable transactions in separate
years, so that the characterization of the latter transaction by the earlier one is necessary
in order to reflect the true taxable income of the taxpayer." 52 T.C. at 175. In Arrow-
smith the taxpayers received distributions as transferees upon liquidation of a corpora-
tion, and classified the receipts as capital gains. In a subsequent tax year they were
required to refund part of the proceeds when a judgment was rendered against the corpo-
ration. Each of the taxpayers took an ordinary business loss for the full amount of his
payments. The Supreme Court found that the losses "fall squarely within the definition
of capital losses," and that liability as transferees "was not based on any ordinary busi-
ness transaction of theirs apart from the liquidation proceedings." 344 U.S. at 8. The
Court found that the tax principle of the annual accounting year was not breached by
looking to the transactions of prior years to classify the nature of the loss for tax pur-
poses.
20. 52 T.C. at 173.
21. Id. at 176.
22. The concurring judges suggested that the payment might be considered as addi-
tional basis of the purchased stock for tax purposes. Id.
23. 428 F.2d 259 (6th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 909 (1971).
24. 394 U.S. 678 (1969). This decision was released nine days prior to the Tax
Court's opinion.
25. The deduction was taken under INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 613.
26. 394 U.S, at 685. Skelly Oil may have misinterpreted Arrowsmith. Arrow-
smith did not refer to a different rate of taxation, but to the close relationship between
two transactions. Although Skelly Oil broadly characterizes Arrowsmith as requiring
all income taxed at "special" reduced rates when received to have a corresponding reduc-
tion in the deduction if part is refunded, it is clear from the majority opinion that the
Court did not intend the application of Skelly Oil to be far-reaching, since it indicated
that the approach taken would affect "only a few cases." Id. at 686. Three dissentingjudges warned that the broad statements in the majority opinion contravened the purpose
of the annual accounting principle. Id. at 697. It is far from clear whether Skelly Oil
requires in all situations where income is taxed at capital gains rates when received that
repayments have capital loss treatment. For a discussion of situations to which Skelly
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that Arrowsmith and Skelly Oil require that income taxed at reduced rates
when reported should not be given the preferential treatment of an ordinary
deduction in the full amount, and thus the payment must be deducted as a
capital loss. 27
The Tax Court, however, refused to alter its position, maintaining in
James E. Anderson28 that the requisite "integral relation" was missing. Ad-
ditionally, the court noted, the taxpayers in Arrowsmith and Skelly Oil, when
required to make payments, occupied the same status as they held when re-
porting the income. Conversely, the insider in Anderson reported his taxes
as a shareholder and incurred section 16(b) liability as an employee. 29  The
Tax Court found that the payment was made to preserve the taxpayer's
employment and to avoid injury to his business reputation, and should be
characterized as an ordinary business expense.30
The Seventh Circuit reversed the Tax Court in Anderson, characterizing the
payment as a return of a portion of -the sales proceeds. 3 1 The court consid-
ered the purposes of section 16(b) relevant to the determination of the
character of the deduction and refused to interpret the Internal Revenue Code
"so as to allow this anomalous result which severely and directly frustrates
the purpose of Section 16(b)."'32  It found the Tax Court's argument that
the payments were made in different capacities unpersuasive, and the tax-
payer's motive in making the payments irrelevant.33 The court said that
where, as in Anderson, the repayment occurred in the year of the sale-pur-
chase transaction, a capital loss deduction was most appropriate, and, there-
fore, the alternative suggested by some commentators of adding the repay-
ment to -the basis of the shares purchased would not be considered.3 4 Thus,
the Tax Court now maintains that the payment when meeting the require-
ments of section 162(a) may be an ordinary and necessary business expense,
while the Sixth and Seventh Circuits have allowed only capital loss treatment. 3
Oil might be applicable, see Rabinovitz, Effect of Prior Year's Transactions on Federal
Income Tax Consequences of Current Receipts or Payments, 28 TAx L. REv. 85 (1972).
27. 428 F.2d at 263.
28. 56 T.C. 1370 (1971), rev'd, 480 F.2d 1304 (7th Cir. 1973).
29. 56 T.C. at 1374-75.
30. Id. at 1372.
31. 480 F.2d 1304, 1307.
32. Id. at 1308.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 1308 n.9. The Anderson decision was based on the position that Arrow-
smith required characterization of the payment in the same manner as the proceeds of
the sale. In Arrowsmith, however, the repayment was made in the year following the
liquidating distribution; there would have been no need for the Arrowsmith decision if
the refunds had been made in the same year as the distribution. Rather, refunds made
in the same year would simply have reduced the amount of capital gain reported in that
year.
Addition of the § 16(b) payment to the basis of the purchased shares as a solution
has been discussed by several commentators. See generally Darrell, supra note 7, at 92;
Lokken, Tax Significance of Payments in Satisfaction of Liabilities Arising Under Sec-
tion 16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 4 GA. L. REv. 298, 309-11 (1970);
Rabinovitz, Effect of Prior Year's Transactions on Federal Income Tax Consequences
of Current Receipts or Payments, 28 TAx L. REV. 85, 109 (1972).
35. Charles I. Brown, 32 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1300 (1973), involving the same is-
sue, is now on appeal to the Tenth Circuit. The Fifth Circuit has not ruled on the
characterization of § 16(b) payments for purposes of federal income tax deduction. The
problem was mentioned in a 1974 Fifth Circuit case involving the deduction of payments




Nathan Cummings36 involved a sale-purchase transaction with a possible
violation of section 16(b), and a resultant repayment of section 16(b) profits
to the corporation in a year subsequent to the year in which the gain from
the sale was reported. The first Cummings decision3 7 was rendered before
the Seventh Circuit's reversal of Anderson. In the first decision the Tax
Court held that Arrowsmith was not applicable "because the section 16(b)
payment was not directly and integrally related to the earlier sales transac-
tion which gave rise to the capital gain."38  The court observed the absence
of relationship between the amount of capital gain on the sale and the
amount of the section 16(b) payment.8 9 It found that the taxpayer's pay-
ment was made in the status of a director, while the capital gain tax was
paid in the status of a shareholder. 40  The overriding business purposes in
making the payment satisfying section 162(a) were found to be 'for the pro-
tection of his business reputation and avoidance of delay in the issuance of
the MGM proxy statement.41
After Anderson was reversed, Cummings was reconsidered by the Tax
Court on motion for rehearing, and the original decision was affirmed. 42 The
Arrowsmith "integral relationship" was found to be lacking, because the pay-
ment and the earlier sale in Cummings were not parts of a unified whole. 43
The court reasoned that the payments made in Arrowsmith and Skelly Oil,
if made in the year of the 'first transaction, would have been offset against
the amount of capital gain, and any excess would have reduced the percent-
age depletion allowance. In Cummings, had the payment been made in
the same year as the sale and purchase, "there would have been no reason
to require that the payment be offset against the gain realized on the sale."
'44
The Tax Court found it significant that Cummings had not been adjudged
guilty of the section 16(b) violation.4 5  One dissenting judge in Cummings
United States, 490 F.2d 203 (5th Cir. 1974), petition for cert. filed, 42 U.S.L.W. 3699
(U.S. May 20, 1974) (No. 73-1733). The taxpayer cited as authority the Tax Court's
decisions in Charles 1. Brown, James E. Anderson, William L. Mitchell, Laurence E.
Marks, and Nathan Cummings. The Fifth Circuit reasoned that even under a narrow
reading of the Arrowsmith principle, such as the Tax Court's interpretation in Anderson,
Arrowsmith applies to the settlement of fraud claims, where the payments were made
in the capacity of seller. The court declined to comment on the dispute between the
Tax Court and the courts of appeals.
36. 61 T.C. 1 (1973), aff'g 60 T.C. 91, appeal docketed, No. 74-1406 (2d Cir., Jan.
8, 1974).
37. 60 T.C. 91 (1973).
38. Id. at 94.
39. id.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 95.
42. 61 T.C. 1 (1973); see note 4 supra.
43. 61 T.C. at 2.
44. Id. at 2-3; cf. discussion of Anderson in note 34 supra.
45. 61 T.C. at 3. He repaid the § 16(b) profit the day after receiving his notifica-
tion of a possible violation, without legal advice, in order that the proxy statement could
go out. Without a definite violation of § 16(b), the court implied, there is no frustra-
tion of public policy. Tank Truck Rentals, Inc. v. Commissioner, 356 U.S. 30 (1958),
was held not to be applicable because it involved an admitted violation of state law. In
Tank Truck Rentals the taxpayer motor carrier had paid large fines to the State of Penn-
sylvania for intentional violations of state maximum weight laws. The deduction of
money paid as fines was disallowed altogether because "allowance of the deduction
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found Skelly Oil controlling, but offered no reasons for his position, and sug-
gested that the appropriate solution would be an addition of the payment to
the basis of the shares purchased. 46 Thus, the payment would .be treated
as an additional cost of acquiring the purchased shares, and the taxpayer
would not recoup any of his capital gains tax until he sold the purchased
stock.
The Tax Court's analysis of Arrowsmith as it applies to the sale-purchase
transaction appears correct because the section 16(b) liability does not arise
from the sale transaction standing alone, and the purchase has no income
tax significance. 47 Section 16(b) liability is independent of the capital gain,
if any, resulting from the sale. For the Arrowsmith principle to apply, the
section 16(b) payment must have a direct connection with the sale, so that
the payment is a continuation of the sale transaction. 48  The section 16(b)
payment arises because of the sale combined with the subsequent purchase,
but the payment is not a refund of the profit of the sale, so as to qualify it
under the Arrowsmith principle. 49 Although the Sixth and Seventh Circuits
found the Skelly Oil interpretation of A rrowsmith controlling, the Tax Court
mentioned Skelly Oil only to distinguish it by the integral relationship rea-
soning.50 The Tax Court seems to imply that Skelly Oil does not expand the
Arrowsmith principle for purposes of determining whether a section 16(b)
would frustrate sharply defined national or state policies proscribing particular types of
conduct, evidenced by some governmental declaration thereof." Id. at 33-34. Other
cases have limited the scope of Tank Truck Rentals. See, e.g., Commissioner v. Sulli-
van, 356 U.S. 27 (1958), where a bookmaker was allowed a deduction for amounts paid
as wages and rent in carrying on illegal gambling operations, and Commissioner v. Tel-
lier, 383 U.S. 687 (1966), where the taxpayer was allowed to deduct legal expenses in-
curred in the unsuccessful defense of charges for violation of the mail fraud statute and
the Securities Act of 1933. Generally, the "frustration of public policy" rationale in-
voked in Skelly Oil and Tank Truck Rentals has been applied only where the payments
were in satisfaction of a fine. Nelson, Tax Deductibility of Insider Profit Repayment:
Resolving An Apparent Conflict, 24 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 330, 347 (1973). The Tax
Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, 83 Stat. 487, codified certain deductions which
would not be permitted, including bribes, fines and penalties, and antitrust damages pay-
ments.
46. 61 T.C. at 5. Five other dissenting judges referred to the reasons given in their
dissent in James E. Anderson, 56 T.C. 1370, 1377-79 (1971).
47. The purchase-sale transaction should receive different tax treatment. In such
cases, the repayment immediately follows the sale, and the § 16(b) profit will usually
equal the capital gain on the sale where the shares sold were the shares purchased. The
Arrowsmith integral relationship is present, so the Arrowsmith principle should be ap-
plied to require a capital loss deduction. It has been argued that if the repayment in
a purchase-sale transaction is made in a subsequent tax year, reductions or increases in
the deduction should be made, to correspond with changes in the taxpayer's income tax
bracket or other factors, so as to achieve a perfectly neutral tax result. Nelson, supra
note 45, at 349-51. However, since in other situations where a change in tax brackets
is permitted to produce a "windfall" for either the government or the taxpayer (see
United States v. Skelly Oil Co., 394 U.S. 678, 681 (1968)), the insider payment should
be no different.
48. See Arrowsmith v. Commissioner, 344 U.S. 6, 8 (1952).
49. A crucial disagreement between the Tax Court and the Sixth and Seventh Cir-
cuits was whether the § 16(b) payment can be tied to the sale in a sale-purchase trans-
action. Compare Anderson v. Commissioner, 480 F.2d 1304, 1307 (7th Cir. 1973),
with James E. Anderson, 56 T.C. 1370, 1376 (1971).
50. 61 T.C. at 2-3. Nor did the Tax Court deal at length with Skelly Oil in An-
derson. There, Skelly Oil was distinguished because the repayments in Skelly Oil were
made in the same status as the income was reported, and because of the integral rela-
tionship between the repayment and the income reported in Skelly.
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payment must receive capital loss treatment. 51 Thus, the Tax Court has
read Arrowsmith narrowly in allowing an ordinary business expense deduc-
tion for a payment in satisfaction of an alleged insider violation, because
the business purpose requirement of section 162(a) was met.52  In con-
trast, the emphasis in the Sixth and Seventh Circuits has been on achieving
an overall equitable result, rather than applying the case law literally.53
Section 16(b) and its legislative history express a policy which should not
be overlooked when considering the tax consequences of deductions for in-
sider payments. The language of section 16(b),5 4 its legislative history,55
and its judicial interpretation50 indicate that the purposes of the section are
deterrent and remedial. Even if an insider's section 16(b) liability is ques-
tionable, allowing a tax advantage to a short-swing trader who can show a
business purpose in repaying, without an inquiry into actual liability, under-
cuts the deterrent policy of section 16(b) and discriminates against one
electing to contest his liability. 57 Since the Tax Court cannot determine
section 16(b) liability, an attempt to distinguish between those insiders likely
to prevail if contested and those unlikely to prevail would be incomplete and
improper at the Tax Court level.58
Ideally, the alleged insider would be neither penalized nor benefited tax-
wise as a consequence of having taken a short-swing profit. Either a capital
loss deduction or an addition of the payment to the basis of the purchased
shares more closely achieves a neutral tax effect than does an ordinary loss
deduction. The deduction has been treated as a capital loss in the Sixth and
Seventh Circuits because Arrowsmith was held to require treatment of the re-
payment in a manner consistent with the way in which income from the
sale had been reported. Because Arrowsmith, properly construed, is not
controlling,59 addition to basis is preferable in a sale-purchase situation
where the repayment occurs in a subsequent tax year. Because a capital loss
deduction in a subsequent tax year may have a penalizing effect on the tax-
payer if he has no corresponding capital gain in the year of repayment, addi-
tion of the section 16(b) payment to the basis of the purchased shares pro-
vides a more neutral tax effect than capital loss treatment.60  Likewise,
51. The Seventh Circuit in Anderson correctly observed that if the payments are
considered a return of the sale proceeds, Arrowsmith is applicable with or without the
benefit of its interpretaion in Skelly Oil. 480 F.2d at 1307.
52. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 162(a) provides that a taxpayer may deduct "all
the ordinary and necessary expenses paid or incurred . . . in carrying on any trade or
business .... "
53. "Since there is hardly anything inevitable about whether the § 16(b) payments
inherit the capital character of the sale transaction, we think the purpose and operation
of Section 16(b) relevant to the determination." Anderson v. Commissioner, 480 F.2d
1304, 1307 (7th Cir. 1973).
54. See note 1 supra.
55. See note 7 supra.
56. See text accompanying note 15 supra.
57. The business purpose required by § 162(a) usually will not be difficult to show
in the situation of § 16(b) payments; a desire to avoid damage to one's reputation in
the financial community would apply to most insider repayments.
58. The Seventh Circuit in Anderson suggested that the taxpayer should have pro-
posed a defense theory to raise doubt as to his § 16(b) liability. 480 F.2d at 1308.
59. See text accompanying notes 47-49 supra.
60. Addition to basis seems preferable to capital loss treatment even when the pay-
ment is made in the same year as the gain from the sale is reported, because the payment
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Skelly Oil is not controlling, since if the section 16(b) payments are not identi-
fied as a return of the sale proceeds, it is inaccurate to treat the repayments as
taxed at special reduced rates when received. 61 The Tax Court in Cummings
correctly found Skelly Oil inapplicable, but should have provided more sup-
port for its position than the relatively weak argument which was presented,
that the section 16(b) payments were made by Cummings in his capacity
as an employee in contrast to the sale which was consummated by him in his
capacity as a shareholder.
By describing a return of the insider to the position he occupied before en-
gaging in the offending transactions,6 2 Revenue Ruling 61-115 confuses the
federal income tax consequences of section 16(b) with its purposes under se-
curities law. If the revenue ruling can be interpreted as advocating a return
of the insider to the position he would have been in if the sale and the pur-
chase had been made at the same price, and no section 16(b) liability had
been incurred, then an addition to the basis of the purchased shares in the
amount of the section 16(b) payment approximates this position. Since the
transaction that triggers liability is the subsequent purchase, this interpreta-
tion may be accurate. The recoupment of tax will be deferred until the pur-
chased shares are sold, but that result does not seem inconsistent with the
purposes of section 16(b). Treating the payment as an added cost of acquir-
ing the purchased shares would more clearly reflect acquisition cost of the
purchased shares, would achieve the purposes of section 16(b), and is con-
sistent with Revenue Ruling 61-115.
IV. CONCLUSION
Although section 16(b) is not a: penalty provision, the deterrent policy
underlying the section should not be undercut by allowing a taxpayer to
profit taxwise as a result of a short-swing trade. Arrowsmith and Skelly
Oil, properly construed, are not applicable to the deduction of insider repay-
ments if liability results from a sale followed by a purchase. Ideally, the net
tax effect of a deduction for an insider repayment would be neither a gain
nor a loss for the taxpayer, and an addition of the section 16(b) payment to
the basis of the purchased shares most nearly accomplishes a neutral after-
tax result. The circuit courts should adopt the addition to basis solution or
follow the Tax Court's lead in letting Congress rectify inconsistencies in the
interaction of the tax law and securities law. 63
Margaret E. Barrett
is not a refund of the actual profit on the sale, and usually will not equal the capital
gains tax paid. See note 2 supra.
61. See text accompanying note 26 supra.
62. See note 14 supra, and accompanying text.
63. The dissenting judge in Cummings who recommended addition of the payment
to basis observed, "[T]he proposal I am making is not before the Court in this case, and
may never be urged by either a taxpayer or the Commissioner, because a tax benefit
in the hand is worth two possible ones in the future .... ." 61 T.C. at 5. For the
proposition that general equitable considerations have no place in the administration of
tax laws, see United States v. Skelly Oil Co., 394 U.S. 678, 692-93 (1969) (dissenting
opinion); Lewyt Corp. v. Commissioner, 349 U.S. 237, 240 (1955); International Trad-
ing Co. v. Commissioner, 484 F.2d 707 (7th Cir. 1973); Anderson v. Commissioner,
480 F.2d 1304, 1309 (7th Cir. 1973) (dissenting opinion); Busse v. Commissioner, 479
F.2d 1147 (7th Cir. 1973); United States v. Shirah, 253 F.2d 798 (4th Cir. 1958).
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When Are Patent Applications Property of a Depreciable
Character Under Section 1239?-Chu v. Commissioner
Taxpayer Lan Jen Chu, an authority on electromagnetic theory and an-
tenna systems, filed a patent application with the United States Government
on June 26, 1956, seeking to patent a new antenna system. After receiving
notice on three occasions that the primary claims had been disallowed,1 Dr.
Chu assigned his interest in the invention to his controlled corporation, Chu
Associates. 2  Subsequently, the application was approved. Pursuant to the
assignment, Dr. Chu received considerable sums of money which he reported
as long-term capital gain. The Commissioner assessed a deficiency under
section 1239 of the Internal Revenue Codes on the grounds that the sums
received were ordinary income. The Tax Court ruled in favor of the tax-
payer, declaring that section 1239 was inapplicable.4  An appeal was taken
by the Commissioner. Held, affirmed: A patent application is ordinarily
neither a depreciable asset, nor property of a character subject 'to deprecia-
tion; the Chu application had not so fully matured5 by the time of transfer
as to be considered depreciable for the purpose of section 1239. Chu v.
Commissioner, 486 F.2d 696 (1st Cir. 1973).
I. TAXATION OF PATENT TRANSFERS BETWEEN AN INDIVIDUAL
AND HIS CONTROLLED CORPORATION
Capital Gains Treatment of Patent Transfers and the Treatment of Gain as
Ordinary Income Under Section 1239. The Internal Revenue Code pro-
1. The application contained 18 separate claims. The primary claims, 1-13, em-bodied the basic antenna structure. Claims 14-18 involved an alternate system which
was never produced.
2. INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 1239 defines a controlled corporation as one in
which the taxpayer, his spouse, and his minor children and minor grandchildren own
more than 80% in value of the outstanding stock. The control question was not at issuein Chu, as both the Tax Court and the First Circuit held that the depreciation questiondisposed of the case and that questions regarding control need not be decided. It is pos-
sible, however, for taxpayers to avoid § 1239 by owning less than 80% in value of the
outstanding stock. See United States v. Parker, 376 F.2d 402 (5th Cir. 1967); Trotz
v. Commissioner, 361 F.2d 927 (10th Cir. 1966); Mitchell v. Commissioner, 300 F.2d
533 (4th Cir. 1962). See also Note, Meaning of More Than 80% in Value of the Out-
standing Stock Under § 1239, 66 MICH. L. REV. 533, 536-40 (1968).
3. INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 1239 provides in part:(a) In the case of a sale or exchange, directly or indirectly, of property
described in subsection (b)-
(2) between an individual and a corporation more than 80 percent in
value of the outstanding stock of which is owned by such individual, his
spouse, and his minor children and minor grandchildren;
any such gain recognized to the transferor from the sale or exchange of
such property shall be considered as gain from the sale or exchange of
property which is neither a capital asset nor property described in section
1231.(b) This section shall apply only in the case of a sale or exchange by a
transferor of property which in the hands of the transferee is property of
a character which is subject to the allowance for depreciation provided in
section 167.
4. Lan Jen Chu, 58 T.C. 598 (1972).
5. See Estate of Stahl v. Commissioner, 442 F.2d 324 (7th Cir. 1971), discussed
at text accompanying notes 18-25 infra.
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vides in section 1235 that "[a] transfer . ..of all substantial rights to a pat-
ent shall be considered the sale or exchange of a capital asset held for
more than 6 months . ... 6 This applies regardless of whether payments
for the patent rights are to ,be periodic, or contingent on productivity.7 Thus,
the proceeds from a transfer of patent rights are entitled to the preferential
capital gains treatment provided by section 1201.8 By affording such treat-
ment to patent transfers, the Government provides a greater incentive to in-
ventors. 9
Section 1239, however, places certain constraints on the availability of this
favorable capital gains treatment. 10 Gains realized on the transfer of prop-
erty of a character subject to depreciation between an individual and his corn-
trolled corporation will be taxed as ordinary income." Section 1239 was
intended to discourage the practice of selling depreciable assets to controlled
corporations in order to obtain certain tax advantages.' 2 Previously, income
from such transfers was taxed at capital gains rates, while the taxpayer's con-
trolled corporation was provided with an asset the depreciation of which
could be offset against ordinary income.' 3
The Depreciability of Patent Applications and the Maturity Question. The
key to ,the applicability of section 1239 lies in the definiton of "depreciable
property." While a patent is a form of property which 'is subject to the al-
lowance for depreciation, 14 a patent application is not ordinarily considered
depreciable property. 15  The uncertain duration of a patent application
6. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 1235; see Storm v. United States, 243 F.2d 708 (5th
Cir. 1957); Lawrence v. United States, 242 F.2d 542 (5th Cir. 1957). See generally
J. MCFADDEN & C. TusKA, ACCOUNTING AND TAX ASPECTS OF PATENTS AND RESEARCH
109-17, 180-214 (1960); Meyer & Hickey, Taxation of Contingent Payments on the Sale
of a Patent, 14 IDEA 497 (1970-71).
7. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 1235(a)(1), (2).
8. Id. § 1201. This section provides for an alternate tax which affords preferential
treatment to income realized on the sale of capital assets held for more than six months
as defined in § 1221. See generally R. HOLZMAN, FEDERAL TAXATION OF CAPITAL
ASSETS (1969); L. SELTZER, THE NATURE AND TAX TREATMENT OF CAPITAL GAINS AND
LOSSES (1951).
9. Lower capital gains rates make patent transfers more profitable, thus providing
added incentive for inventors in their quest for discovery of patentable inventions, and
at the same time encouraging greater transferability of patent rights. See S. REP. No.
1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 113-14 (1954). See also Fawick v. Commissioner, 436 F.2d
655 (6th Cir. 1971).
10. Because of its limited scope, § 1239 has been regarded as an ineffective tool
in the hands of the Commissioner. See Ellis, Tax Problems in Sales to Controlled Cor-
porations, 21 VAND. L. REV. 196, 200-01 (1965). See also notes 41, 42 infra and ac-
companying text.
11. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 1239.
12. H.R. REP. No. 586, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. 26 (1951); S. REP. No. 781, 82d Cong.,
1st Sess. 69 (1951); CONF. REP. ON H.R. 4473, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. (1951).
13. Chu v. Commissioner, 486 F.2d 696, 704 (1st Cir. 1973) (Campbell, J., concur-
ring). This would be especially advantageous in an inflationary economy because the
royalties based on a percentage of gross sales would increase with inflation, but would
receive preferential tax treatment normally afforded capital gains. In addition to this,
during an inflationary period the value of the invention is virtually sure to increase dur-
ing the time between application for and issuance of a patent, thus establishing a higher
basis for the allowance for depreciation. See generally W. PETERSON, INCOME, EMPLOY-
MENT, AND ECONOMIC GROWTH 363-98 (1967).
14. See, e.g., American Chem. Paint Co. v. Commissioner, 66 F.2d 381 (3d Cir.
1933); Kershaw v. United States, 180 F. Supp. 415 (Ct. Cl. 1960).
15. Hershey Mfg. Co., 14 B.T.A. 867, 876-77, aff'd, 43 F.2d 298 (10th Cir. 1930),
wherein the Board of Tax Appeals stated:
It is elementary that an asset which has no definite period of useful life is
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makes it difficult to determine the amount of depreciation in any given
year.16 A patent application is generally considered an inchoate right which
matures into a depreciable asset when letters of patent are issued. 17
However, in Estate of Stahl v. Commissioner'8 the Seventh Circuit rec-
ognized that patent applications possess many characteristics normally as-
sociated with depreciable property19 and set forth guidelines for determining
when a patent application might be considered property of a character sub-
ject ,to depreciation for the purpose of section 1239.20 The court stated that
there is often some point in the application process when a patent application
has so fully matured that it should be considered depreciable. 21  When only
the ministerial acts of processing the application remain, so that issuance is
virtually certain, the application will be regarded as the substantial equivalent
of a depreciable patent. 2 Notices of allowability were held to be the proper
indicia of maturity.
In Stahl the taxpayer transferred to his controlled corporation (1) patents,
(2) patent applications, which, prior to transfer, the Patent Office had al-
not the proper subject of exhaustion, as one of the essentials to measuring
the deduction is unknown .... Furthermore, the date the patent issues
marks the beginning of the asset in use as an enforceable right, as well as
fixes its life. It follows that the inchoate right represented by a patent ap-
plication matures into a depreciable asset beginning with the date the pat-
ent is issued ....
See also Estate of Stahl v. Commissioner, 442 F.2d 324 (7th Cir. 1971), a!f'g in part,
rev'g in part, 52 T.C. 591 (1969); Sarkes Tarzanian, Inc. v. United States, 159 F. Supp.
253 (S.D. Ind. 1958); United States Mineral Prod. Co., 52 T.C. 177 (1969); Max A.
Burde, 43 T.C. 252 (1964), aff'd, 352 F.2d 995 (2d Cir. 1965); Twin Disc Clutch Co.,
2 B.T.A. 1327 (1925). See generally 4 J. MERTENS, THE L.Aw oF FEDERAL INCOME
TAXATION § 23.74 (1973).
16. 14 B.T.A. 867, aff'd, 43 F.2d 298 (10th Cir. 1930). See also United States v.
American Bell Tel. Co., 167 U.S. 224 (1897), where the Court noted that the final deci-
sion of the Patent Office as to whether a patent will issue cannot be foretold.
17. See cases cited note 15 supra. An inventor has no exclusive right and cannot
exclude others from the use of his invention until he obtains letters of patent. See Coak-
well v. United States, 372 F.2d 508 (Ct. Cl. 1967). However, an applicant can take
advantage of Patent Office interference procedures under 35 U.S.C. § 135 (1970) to pro-
tect his rights as the first inventor. Cf. 35 U.S.C. § 102(g) (1970); Marconi Wireless
Tel. Co. v. United States, 320 U.S. 1 (1942).
18. 442 F.2d 324 (7th Cir. 1971).
19. The language of § 1239(b) qualifies the word "depreciable" with the words "of
a character." Patent applications do possess many of the characteristics normally asso-
ciated with depreciable property. They are used "in trade or business" and are held for
the "production of income." See INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 167. In some instances
patent applications are actually considered to be depreciable. Rev. Rul. 67-136, 1967-1
CUM. BULL. 58, provides that where a patent will issue in the normal course of events,
and the purchase price is fixed by contract as a percentage of the annual return derived
from the use of the patent over its life, an amount equal to the price paid for patents
or patent applications during the taxable year may be deducted under § 167. It was
felt that the use of amounts which the taxpayer had contractually obligated himself to
pay as the measure of the allowance for depreciation would assure the minimum distor-
tion of income. See Best Lock Corp., 31 T.C. 1217 (1959); Associated Patentees, Inc.,
4 T.C. 979 (1945), acquiesced in 1959-2 CUM. BULL. 3. Neither the ruling nor the
cases define what is meant by the words "normal course." Presumably the reference
is to an application which has been fully processed by the applicant and which appears
to be allowable so that the application is the substantial equivalent of a patent itself.
20. 442 F.2d 324 (7th Cir. 1971).
21. Id.
22. Id. at 328. Although the Stahl court did not take note of Rev. Rul. 67-136,
it could be argued that when an application is such that a patent is sure to issue in the
normal course and therefore depreciable under the ruling, the application must, by its
very nature, be mature under the Stahl test,
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lowed or indicated appeared allowable, and (3) patent applications which
had been rejected. 23  As to those applications which had been allowed or
which appeared allowabe, the court ruled that they would mature into pat-
ents "with the merest of diligence by the transferee in processing the appli-
cation after sale," 24 and, therefore, should be considered property of a de-
preciable character under section 1239. The court did not apply section
1239 to those applications which had been rejected prior to their transfer,
despite the fact that one of the applications was later approved.25  Thus,
Stahl endorsed the view that while patent applications are generally not de-
preciable assets, when mature they may be treated as depreciable for the
purpose of section 1239.
II. CHU V. COMMISSIONER
Underlying the entire Chu opinion is the view that section 1239 applies
only to depreciable property, and not to property which might ultimately
become depreciable. 26 The court rejected the Government's contention that
the broad language of section 1239(b) 27 endorses the treatment of patent
applications as depreciable property for the purpose of section 1239.28 Al-
though the First Circuit recognized that the Government's position might be
sound tax policy, the court saw its role not as one of formulating tax policy,
"but rather to ensure that the enactments of Congress are implemented in
accordance with their intended legislative design."'29 An examination of -the
legislative history of section 1239 convinced the court that the statute was
intended to apply only to depreciable property.30
Justification for this approach was found by noting the situation which
might confront an inventor whose patent application is rejected. 31 Under the
Government's proposal -there would be no added incentive to an inventor be-
cause his controlled corporation would not receive a depreciable asset, and
he would still be taxed at ordinary rates on the income realized from the
23. Id. at 326.
24. Id. at 328. After notice of allowability the applicant need only make a timely
payment of the issue fee as required by Patent Office Rule 314, 37 C.F.R. § 1.314
(1973). An applicant is also required to record any assignment and pay a fee for the
recording. See 37 C.F.R. §§ 1.331, 1.332 (1973).
25. 442 F.2d at 327-28.
26. 486 F.2d at 704.
27. The Government argued that the qualifying words "of a character" in § 1239(b)
gave the court the ability to treat patent applications as depreciable property for the pur-
pose of § 1239. Id. at 700.
28. Id.
29. Id. See McClain v. Commissioner, 311 U.S. 527, 530 (1941), where the Court
stated: "We must apply the statute as we find it, leaving to Congress the correction
of asserted inconsistencies and inequities in its operation." See also Graham v. Com-
missioner, 304 F.2d 707 (2d Cir. 1962); Miller v. Commissioner, 299 F.2d 706 (2d Cir.
1962).
30. 486 F.2d at 700. See also note 12 supra and accompanying text. Further sup-
port for this view was found in Treas. Reg. § 1.1239-1 (1960), which indicates that §
1239 is applicable only to transfers of depreciable property. The court also noted that
the caption to § 1239(b) indicates that it applies only to depreciable property. Judge
Campbell, concurring, noted, however, that "[i]t is virtually inescapable that Congress,
when it passed section 1239, meant to penalize transactions of the sort involved in this
case." 486 F.2d at 705 (Campbell, J., concurring).
31. Id. at 701.
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transfer. The court also noted that it would be anomalous to "say that a pat-
ent application is 'property of a character' subject to depreciation if it is
eventually approved, while [it] is not 'property of a character' subject to de-
preciation if it is not eventually approved."'8 2 Thus, the First Circuit found
that in the case of a transfer 'to a controlled corporation it was "entirely ra-
tional . . . for Congress to conclude .that 1239 should apply only [to de-
preciable property]. ''33
Chu reaffirmed 'the view that patent applications are ordinarily not de-
preciable property. The court relied on substantial Tax Court precedent
beginning with Hershey Manufacturing Co.,8 4 and also noted that approval of
an application is an event of uncertain outcome and that a patent application
"has no definitive life over which to be depreciated."8 5  Judge Campbell,
concurring, stated that "Tax Court precedent, supported by [Stahl], holds
that patent applications are ordinarily not property 'of a character which is
subject to the allowance for depreciation,' ",36 and that the taxpayer is en-
titled to rely on these previous cases "when making decisions that will ir-
revocably fix his liability for taxes."37
Without endorsing the Stahl doctrine,38 the Chu court concluded that Dr.
Chu's application had not so fully matured under the Stahl ,test as to be con-
sidered property of a depreciable character for the purpose of section 1239. 39
The court found authority in Stahl for its conclusion that the Chu application
should not be subject to the constraints of section 1239, since ultimate ap-
proval was not sufficiently certain.40
The First Circuit acknowledged ,that the Chu decision left a loophole
which substantially impaired the effectiveness of section 1239 in dealing with
patent transfers. 41  Decisions following Stahl and Chu point out the inef-
32. Id. at 701 n.6.
33. Id. at 701.
34. 14 B.T.A. 867, affd, 43 F.2d 298 (10th Cir. 1930). For Tax Court precedent
supporting Chu see cases cited note 15 supra.
35. 486 F.2d at 702.
36. Id. at 704 (Campbell, J., concurring). He also noted that the court ignored
Rev. Rul. 67-136 and a line of cases holding that patent applications are, in some in-
stances, depreciable. See note 19 supra. However, consideration of Rev. Rul. 67-136
and the related cases would not have made any difference in Chu, as the basic claims
of Dr. Chu's application were rejected three times by the Patent Office and, therefore,
a patent would probably not have issued in the normal course. See note 22 supra.
37. 486 F.2d at 704 (Campbell, J., concurring).
38. Id. at 703 n.8. The First Circuit in Chu never approved the Stahl decision, and,
in fact, criticized it on the basis that Patent Office notices of allowability are not neces-
sarily final. In support of this view the Chu court cited Patent Office Rule 313 which
indicates that even after notice of allowability patents will not always issue upon the
exercise of the "merest of diligence." Prior to issuance of letters of patent the allowance
may be withdrawn at any time on the grounds of fraud, illegality in the application, any
alleged interference, or mistake on the part of the Patent Office. See 37 C.F.R. § 1.131
(1973).
39. 486 F.2d at 704.
40. Id. at 703. In Stahl the rejected applications were not found to be depreciable
and thus escaped § 1239 in spite of the fact that one of the applications was later ap-
proved. In Chu the claims which represented the "heart" of the invention were "thrice
rejected" by the Patent Office prior to the transfer, and the Tax Court regarded this
as an effective rejection of the whole application, 58 T.C. at 610 n.2. On this basis
the First Circuit found that Dr. Chu's application was not certain to mature into a de-
preciable patent "with the merest of diligence," and that more than the "ministerial act
of 'processing' the application" remained. 486 F.2d at 703.
41. Id. at 700; see note 45 infra.
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fectiveness of section 1239 in preventing a taxpayer from providing his con-
trolled corporation with a depreciation deduction and at the same time pay-
ing capital gains rates on the income received from the transfer. 42 -In Ben-
jamin 1. Davis43 ,the taxpayer had transferred a patent application to his con-
trolled corporation ten months prior to notification of allowability, and de-
spite the invention's obvious patentability, the Tax Court refused to con-
sider it property of a depreciable character.44  Thus, ,if the taxpayer can ef-
fect the assignment to his controlled corporation prior to the maturity of the
application, he can reap substantial tax advantages. 45  The court, noting
that legislative tax reform might be needed in this area,4 6 suggested that cap-
ital gains treatment of income received from -the initial transfer be retained,
but that section 1239 be amended to provide for ordinary income treatment
for all royalty payments received after the application is .approved.47 This
proposal, while avoiding the unfavorable tax situation which might confront
an inventor whose application is rejected, 48 would not effectively fill the loop-
hole since methods of initial payment could 'be devised which would circum-
vent such a provision. 49
Judge Campbell, concurring, suggested that regulations be promulgated to
set out a more specific definition of depreciable property, or to "create a re-
buttable presumption that all patent applications are depreciable." 50  The
specific definition suggested by Judge Campbell would be ideal from the
court's point of view in that judicial construction would be minimized. How-
ever, it is doubtful that such a definition could be fashioned to cover all pos-
sible circumstances while allowing for -the necessary flexibility. 5' The re-
buttable presumption of depreciability offers a way of avoiding the unfavor-
able tax consequences to the inventor which were perceived by the court
under the Government's proposal, 52 while providing for the enforcement of
the spirit of section 1239. 53 When a patent application is transferred to a
42. Benjamin I. Davis, P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 1972-235, aff'd, 491 F.2d 709 (6th Cir.
1974); Vincent W. Eckel, P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 1974-33.
43. P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 1972-235, af 'd, 491 F.2d 709 (6th Cir. 1974).
44. The Davis court relied on Stahl and Chu, as well as Hershey and the earlier
precedent, for the proposition that patent applications are not depreciable property for
the purpose of § 1239 at least until notification of allowability from the Patent Office.
45. When the patent is issued, the taxpayer's controlled corporation will have a de-
preciation deduction from ordinary income at the stepped-up basis of the patent. The
inventor-taxpayer will be taxed at capital gains rates on his personal income realized
from the transfer. This is precisely the kind of transaction which § 1239 was intended
to discourage. See note 12 supra and accompanying text. See also United States v.
Parker, 376 F.2d 402 (5th Cir. 1967); R. HOLZMAN, supra note 8, at 107.
46. 486 F.2d at 704.
47. Id. at 704 n.9.
48. Id. at 701; see note 31 supra and accompanying text.
49. For example, the taxpayer could discount to its present value the expected future
return from the patent and have his controlled corporation pay him this sum initially.
Under the Chu court's proposal such a transaction would receive capital gains treatment.
50. 486 F.2d at 706 (Campbell, J., concurring). He noted that the proposed regula-
tion might allow the taxpayer to apply to the Commissioner for a ruling prior to any
transfer.
51. The limitations of language would likely prevent any successful effort at writing
a definition of property of a depreciable character which would take in all situations
which might arise under § 1239.
52. See note 31 supra and accompanying text.
53. In a proper case such a presumption could be rebutted, thus affording the tax-
payer the opportunity to transfer a non-depreciable patent application to his controlled
1974]
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controlled corporation it seems fair to hold the taxpayer to this presumption,
especially in light of his exhibited belief in the patentability of ,his own in-
vention.54
III. CONCLUSION
The First Circuit could have relied on ,the broad language of section
1239(b), "of a character," and its legislative history, to expand on the ex-
isting precedent, thereby holding that Dr. Chu's patent application was of a
depreciable character for 'the purpose of section 1239. This construction
would not have been unfair in light of the fact that Dr. Chu was fully ac-
quainted with the prior art of antenna systems and expected that letters of
patent would eventually issue on his new system.55 Nevertheless, section
1239 and the relevant Tax Court precedent leads one to the conclusion that
a patent application is ordinarily not property of a depreciable character.
Clearly, legislative or administrative reform is needed. A patent applica-
tion realistically represents the same invention as does a patent. Inventors
whose controlled corporations pay large amounts for patent rights are not
fearful of unfavorable tax consequences, but are rather seeking the sub-
stantial tax advantages of a depreciation deduction for their controlled cor-
porations, and the lower capital gains treatment for personal income realized
on the transfer. Capital gains treatment is normally regarded as "the ex-
ception, not the rule,"5 6 and it is clear that section 1239 was intended to
penalize the transactions within its scope. 57  If the courts are unable 'to find
language in the statute susceptible to judicial construction, Congress or the
Treasury Department should act 'to supply -it. The First Circuit's reform
proposals may provide a starting point.
Barton R. Bentley
corporation. Such a case would be very unusual, however, because the taxpayer wouldbe placed in the anomalous position of asserting the patentability of his invention before
the Patent Office, while arguing non-patentability before the Commissioner.
54. Some commentators have questioned the general efficacy of preferential capital
gains taxation on grounds of basic equity and the belief that the preferential treatment
encourages the conversion of ordinary income into capital gains, thereby distorting oth-
erwise normal investment patterns. See M. DAVID, ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES TO CAPI-
TAL GAINS TAXATION (1968); L. SELTZER, supra note 8, at 285-89. Contra, id. at 282-
85; TAX INSTITUTE, CAPITAL GAINS TAXATION 14-16 (1946). See generally J. PECHMAN,
FEDERAL TAX POLICY 66-67, 96-97 (1971).
55. 58 T.C. at 605. Dr. Chu's expectation is further evidenced by the fact that his
controlled corporation, Chu Associates, agreed to pay $2000 upon the execution of the
assignment and a minimum of $317,000 over the life of the patent. Id.
56. 486 F.2d at 704 (Campbell, J., concurring); see Commissioner v. Gillette Motor
Transp., Inc., 364 U.S. 130 (1960); Corn Prod. Ref. Co. v. Commissioner, 350 U.S. 46
(1955).
57. See note 12 supra and accompanying text.
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